Allegations of misconduct against Nationstar attorneys

On 12/19/22, I filed a motion for an order to show cause why written findings of attorney misconduct should not be forwarded to the State Bar because the State Bar would not investigate complaints without it.

Below is my statement of intent which was to clearly show that my claims had been obstructed and never fully heard due to the misconduct of my opponents.

The motion was made in good faith and supported by verified evidence

Summary of 2/23/22 and 2/28/22 Bar complaints against Nationstar’s attorneys

Nationstar’s attorneys: Wright, Finlay, Zak, LLP

Melanie Morgan (SBN 8215) Akerman LLP

2/28/22 Complaint to State Bar vs. Nationstar’s attorneys: Wright, Finlay, Zak, LLP and

2/23/22 Complaint to Bar vs. Nationstar attorneys Melanie Morgan (SBN 8215) Akerman

Nationstar’s attorneys: Melanie Morgan, Managing Partner Akerman LLP and Wright Finlay Zak, LLP lied about Nationstar being owed a debt; lied about Nationstar having any standing to file a quiet title claim. Abused the HOA quiet title litigation process multiple times as a corrupt business model, representing different lenders who did not NRS 104.3301 standing to foreclose on the 1st deeds of trust they were lying about owning.

  1. The most critical material facts knowingly misrepresented by all of Nationstar’s attorneys related to the assignments and reconveyance of the 1st deed of trust that was extinguished by the 8/15/14 HOA sale:           7/22/04 Hansen deed of trust
  2. 4/12/12 ASSIGN MERS to BANA by BANA – could not transfer interest:
  3. 1) assignment to BANA was void as it was robo-signed days after BANA signed a 4/4/12 consent decree agreeing not to robo-sign documents to fake ownership of loans that basically had been securitized out of existence;
  4. 2) also void because there is no notary record of it (NRS 111.240);
  5. 3) also void because non-compliant with Nevada’s anti-foreclosure fraud law (AB 284 (2011)
  6. 9/9/14 ASSIGN BANA to Wells Fargo by BANA – could not transfer interest:
  7. 1) assignment is void as BANA’s 4/12/12 assignment to itself above was void;
  8. 2) assignment was recorded almost a month after the deed of trust was extinguished by the 8/15/14 HOA sale;
  9. 3) servicing banks BANA’s and Nationstar’s failure to record a notice of default on the 7/22/04 deed of trust constitutes a waiver of any right it may have to use the property as security for the Hansen promissory note;
  10. 4) servicers’ failure to record a notice of default was the direct and proximate cause of the HOA sale because an HOA is prohibited from foreclosing if a lender has recorded a notice of default on the 1st deed of trust (NRS 116.31162(6)(2013)
  11. 12/1/14 ASSIGN BANA to Nationstar by Nationstar – could not transfer interest:
  12. 1) void because BANA had no interest to assign on 12/1/14;
  13. 2) void because it was actually a self-assignment executed without authority by Nationstar;
  14. 3) void because Nationstar did not record or disclose a properly executed power of attorney from BANA;
  15. 4) void because Nationstar rescinded it a week after the end of discovery in the 1st action
  16. 3/8/19 ASSIGN Wells Fargo to Nationstar by Nationstar – could not transfer interest:
  17. 1) void because Wells Fargo had no interest to assign to Nationstar;
  18. 2) void because Nationstar’s robo-signer executed it without authority;
  19. 3) void because Nationstar recorded it after the end of discovery in the 1st action;
  20. 4) void because Nationstar prevailed in the 1st action by filing a non-meritorious joinder on 2/12/19 claiming to be BANA’s successor in interest and then two weeks later rescinding that claim and then after the end of discovery recording a new robo-signed claim to be Wells Fargo’s successor in interest;
  21. 5) Nationstar is judicially estopped from claiming that either it or Wells Fargo is the beneficiary due to its repeated conflicting claims regarding when and from whom it acquired its claimed interest;
  22. 6) Nationstar admitted i n discovery two days after this robo-signed assignment was executed on 2/25/19 that Nationstar was then, and always had been since 12/1/13, only the servicer, never the beneficiary.
  23. 3/8/19 RESCIND 12/1/14 BANA to Nationstar by Nationstar – could not transfer interest as it was rescinding a void assignment:
  24. 1) this rescission was done in bad faith a week after discovery ended after Nationstar learned that Tobin could prove that it was lying about being the beneficiary as BANA’s successor in interest; 2) this was executed by Nationstar robo-signer Mohamed Hammed posing as if he were the V-P of BANA;
  25. 3) In the months following this rescission, Nationstar persisted in its false claim that the sale was valid to extinguish Tobin’s interest by was void to extinguish the interest Nationstar was lying about owning as the successor of BANA
  26. 6/3/19 RECONVEY Hansen DOT to Joel Stokes – not to the borrower’s estate – by Nationstar
  27. 1) void because Nationstar did not have the legal authority to reconvey the deed of trust to anyone, let alone to a non-party two days before the quiet title trial in the 1st action;
  28. 2) void as Nationstar claimed to be both the trustee and the beneficiary when in fact it was neither and therefore had no legal authority to record a reconveyance (NRS 205.395);
  29. 3) Nationstar could not have been both the trustee and the beneficiary as NRS 107.028(2) prohibits it;
  30. 4)  void as it was a fraudulent transfer (NRS 111.175) to consummate the $355,000 devil’s pact between Nationstar and Jimijack recorded on 5/23/19;
  31. 5) underlying deal with Joel Stokes is void as the attorneys misrepresented it as the Nationstar-Jimijack settlement of all claims to the court to gain its imprimatur fraudulently;
  32. 5) void as the Nationstar-Joel Stokes deal excluded Tobin as a necessary party (NRCP 19, NRS 30.130) as she was denied the opportunity to defend her 3/28/17 deed;
  33. 6) void as the lien was released as a quid pro quo to steal Tobin’s property by obstructing her claims from being heard on their merits;
  34. 7) void as this was recorded when Tobin as an individual and as the Hansen Trust trustee had pending quiet title claims against Jimijack to void the defective HOA sale subject to the deed of trust, i.e., Jimijack’s deed was defective and inadmissible as evidence of title (NRS 111.345) and so if Tobin’s claims had been heard on the merits, Jimijack would have lost. Nationstar knew that Tobin knew it did not have standing to foreclose on her if the title was unwound to put her and Nationstar back as if the sale had never happened. The ONLY way they could both win was to obstruct Tobin’s case from being heard and tell the court that they settled the title dispute out of court.
  35. 7) void as Nationstar never produced any evidence that it had any legal right to collect $355,000 in exchange for releasing a lien it did not own;
  36. 7) underlying deal with Joel Stokes is void as Nationstar dismissed all its quiet title claims without adjudication;
  37. 8) void as Nationstar essentially confiscated Tobin’s property without foreclosure and without adjudication, by lying about being the beneficiary and abusing the HOA quiet title litigation process to collect on a debt it was not owed.
  38. 9) void as Nationstar circumvented the restrictions of the PUD Rider Remedies (F) to turn the alleged payment of delinquent HOA assessments into a de facto foreclosure without notice of due process required by NRS 107.080.

Summary of Bar Complaint against Melanie Morgan

  • 1. Met ex parte with Judge Kishner on 4/23/19 after serving notice on all parties through the court’s e-file Odyssey system on 4/15/19 and 4/22/19 that the hearing was continued to 5/7/19 (NCJC 2.9, NRPC 8.4 and ABA standard 6.31(b))
  • 2. As the managing partner over multiple subordinate attorneys, and as the successor of Nationstar’s and BANA’s prior attorneys, Wright, Finley, Zak, perpetrated fraud on the court
  • by misrepresenting to the court the material facts, (e.g., 1) that Nationstar was owed a debt from the 7/22/04 deed of trust that was extinguished by the disputed 8/15/14 HOA sale,
  • 2) that Nona Tobin had not been granted leave to intervene as an individual
  • 3) that Tobin’s 3/28/17 deed did not give her NRS 40.010 standing anyway
  • 4) that the HOA sale was valid for the sub-priority portion of the lien),
  • 5) changed attorneys to create plausible deniability, e.g., removed Karen Whelan after Joe Coppedge asked Nationstar in 2018 to join Tobin in an MSJ to void the sale in its entirety
  • 6) in A-21-828840-C when Nationstar was going to have to respond to Tobin’s claim that it was judicially estopped from claiming to be owed a debt from the Hansen 7/22/04 deed of trust),
  • 7) concealed inculpatory evidence (e.g., all Equator records, communications between Nationstar and Tobin or Nationstar and Red Rock or Nationstar and Wells Fargo) on these dates: 5/15/18, 12/10/18, 2/7/19, 2/12/19, 2/12/19, 2/20/19, 2/21/19, 2/21/19, 2/27/19, 2/28/19, 2/28/19, 3/7/19, 3/12/19, 3/12/19, 3/18/19, 3/21/19, 3/26/19 RTRAN, 4/12/19, 4/15/19, 4/19/19, 4/22/19, 4/23/19, 4/23/19 RTRAN, 4/25/19 RTRAN, 5/3/19, 5/21/19 RTRAN, 5/29/19 RTRAN, 5/31/19, 6/24/19, 6/24/19, 6/25/19, 7/1/19, 7/22/19, 6/25/20, 8/11/20, 4/9/21, 4/26/21, 5/3/21, 5/5/21, 8/19/21, 11/9/21, 11/15/21, 11/16/21, 11/23/21, 11/30/21.
  • 3. In conspiracy with Joseph Hong, made a fraudulent side deal with Joel A. Stokes, that a) was mischaracterized to the court (5/21/19 transcript) status check-settlement documents) as a “Nationstar-Jimijack settlement of all claims” that was recorded on 5/23/19, and
  • b) which allowed Nationstar to be dismissed from the quiet title trial
  • c) so it did not have to produce any evidence to support its quiet title claim
  • and d) evaded either Nationstar or Jimijack having to refute Tobin’s quiet title claims on their merits.
  • 2/23/22 Bar complaint filed against Melanie Morgan Petitioner’s 84371 appendix volume 27 (22-08189) (pages 4045-4154) was supported by exhibits of multiple unadjudicated administrative claims against Nationstar and Akerman.
  • On 2/23/22, Tobin, as the President of Fight Foreclosure Fraud, Inc., filed a complaint against Nationstar’s attorney, Wright, Finlay, Zak, LLP (“WFZ”) that initiated Nationstar’s meritless quiet title complaint. The bar complaint is filed concurrently as a Request for Judicial Notice because it their duplicitous filings are the corrupt foundation of this dispute. However, they ceased to be Nationstar’s attorneys on 4/10/18 when Akerman took over.
  • WFZ aided and abetted mortgage servicing fraud of both Bank of America and Nationstar Mortgage by filing into this quiet title civil dispute statements known to be false and disclosing false evidence on 1/11/16, 4/12/16 DECL, 4/12/16, 5/10/16, 6/2/16, 6/3/16, 6/10/16, 3/27/17 DECL , 3/27/17, 11/9/17, 2/9/18.
  • Assisting lenders to cheat homeowners is WFZ’s business model.
  • Movant requests the court determine if written findings against the WFZ attorneys separate from Nationstar are appropriate given that the four-year statute of limitations for complaints to be addressed by the Bar has passed, but the five-year statute of limitations for racketeering has not.

What the motion to disqualify Judge Peterson seeks

The motion seeks orders from Chief Judge as Judge Peterson’s impartiality in this case can reasonably be questioned

  1. Disqualify Judge Peterson from this case only pursuant to NCJC 2.2 (lack of fairness and impartiality); 2.6 (failure to ensure the right to be heard); 2.7 (failure to decide claims); 2.9 (improper ex parte communications); 2.15 (didn’t report attorney misconduct to the State Bar or take other appropriate actions)
  2. Set aside the 3/28/23 order pursuant to NRCP 5959(a)(1)(A) (irregularity in the proceedings) or (B)(misconduct of prevailing party) (C) (ex parte vexatious litigant bench order in absentia and refusal to attach opposition to order) and/or NRCP 60(b)(1)(mistake, errors of law), NRCP 60(b)(3) (misrepresentation), NRCP 60(d)(3) (fraud on the court) and conduct an evidentiary hearing to establish by clear and convincing evidence that fraud on the court had obstructed a fair adjudication of my claims
  3. Alternatively, simply set aside the 3/28/23 order as being outside the curt’s jurisdiction, unsupported by undisputed facts, containing findings that are not supported by evidence and improperly filed without allowing me to attach my opposition to it, and grant my 12/19/22 and 1/23/23 unopposed motions pending when Judge Peterson’s improper ex parte hearing unfairly exempted my opponents from meeting the requirements of EDCR 2.20, i.e., (filed a written opposition to motions)
  4. By settling the jurisdictional question of standing first, based on evidence, facts, and law, striking rogue filings, and treating non-party Red Rock LLC exactly the way I was treated in the 1st action when I was removed from the case as an individual party before the trial, this case could be resolved immediately and fairly.

The Chief Judge is asked to balance the equities:

Should the Chief Judge disqualify Judge Peterson so another court can conduct the NRS 40.110 evidentiary hearing that has never been held to resolve Tobin’s title dispute?


Should the Chief Judge let stand an order that restricts Tobin’s filing any civil action vs. any defendant for any cause of action except if an attorney file it for her?

“Within 10 days after the service of the motion, and 5 days after service of any joinder to the motion, the opposing party must serve and file written notice of non-opposition or opposition thereto, together with a memorandum of points and authorities and supporting affidavits, if any, stating facts showing why the motion and/or joinder should be denied. Failure of the opposing party to serve and file written opposition may be construed as an admission that the motion and/or joinder is meritorious and a consent to granting the same.”

EDCR 2.20(e) Motions; contents; responses and replies; calendaring a fully briefed matter.
Consider the overwhelming, unjustified prejudice to Tobin, and unfair advantage to her opponents, if the 3/28/23 order stands
  1. defamtory order declares me a vexatious litigant when there are no facts to justify it.
  2. I am publicly humiliated and branded by an egragiously unfair and overly broad order that is faught with unsubstantiated, factually incorrect, insulting lies while I am blocked from getting my legitimate claims addressed.
  3. I am prohibited from complaining about the attorneys who lied to the court, filed meritless claims by lying about their clients’ standing and misrepresenting the evidence, who entered false and falsified evidence into the record, who obstructed my case from being heard on the merits by unethical means including improper ex parte communications and concealing inculpatory evidence, who fraudulently transferrred the title before the trial, who falsified title reports
  4. A judge’s personal opinion stands that my complaints against attorneys and the prior judge are “unprovable” and “improper” solely because she decided she didn’t need to conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide against me and order me not to stop complaining.
  5. The motion for an order to show cause why attorneys should not be disciplined for filing false evidence, obstructing my case, that restricts me from filing any civil action vs. any defendant for any cause of action as a pro se is unappealable because Judge Peterson neither granted the motion nor denied in an appealable order. Therefore, the attorneys get a free pass from ever having to refute or deny my claims and I am prohibited from complaining about it.
Consider there is no prejudice to Judge Peterson if she voluntarily recuses herself or if Chief Judge excludes her from the decision to set aside the 3/28/23 order on jurisdictional or other grounds

None. She continues to be a judge. She just makes no more decisions on this case. Whether the reviewing judge decides to set aside the 3/28/23 order because Judge peterson acted outside her jurisdiction to grant relief to a non-party or acted improperly to exempt Tobin’s opponents from the EDCR 2.20 requirements at the unnoticed ex parte hearing or for whatever reason, Tobin will be made whole, at no cost to Judge Peterson. She never has to see the case again. It doesn’t go to the courts of appeal or the the commission on judicial and so her permanent record is unaffected.


There’s a hard way that everyone will fight

1. Declarations and exhibits provide evidence and legal authority to justify reassigning the case to another judge for a new trial so an evidentiary hearing can be finally held as Tobin has repeated requested and her opponents have repeatedly obstructed.

And there’s an easy way to end it without appeal

2.alternatively, the case can be resolved immediately on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., that Red Rock LLC’s lack of standing as an interested party to the dispute requires that its rogue filings be stricken from the record by granting Tobin’s 1/23/23 motions as unopposed and adopting the order submitted on 2/10/23 that Judge Peterson denied because she had improperly and unfairly exempted Tobin’s opponents from EDCR 2.20 at the 2/2/23 ex parte hearing.

Judge Peterson forgot I was the victim and thinks Scow did nothing wrong keeping the excess proceeds from the HOA sale for 8+years

What the law requires

What interpleader standard is

“Legal Standard “In an interpleader action, the ‘stakeholder’ of a sum of money sues all those who might have a claim to the money, deposits the money with the district court, and lets the claimants litigate who is entitled to the money.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1992)

“Accordingly, many courts have held that those who have acted in bad faith to create a controversy over the stake may not claim the protection of interpleader. See, e.g., Kent v. N. Cal. Reg’l Office of Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 497 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir.1974) (“Interpleader, which is an equitable remedy, is not available to one who has voluntarily accepted funds knowing they are subject to competing claims.”) (citations omitted); Farmers Irrigating Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Kane, 845 F.2d 229, 232 (10th Cir.1988) (“It is the general rule that a party seeking interpleader must be free from blame in causing the controversy, and where he stands as a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter of the suit or any of the claimants, he cannot have relief by interpleader.”) (collecting cases); see also44B Am. Jur. 2d Interpleader § 7 (“The equitable doctrine of ‘clean hands’ applies to interpleader actions.”

Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows interpleader of disputed funds where a Plaintiff is subject to double or multiple liability. Perfekt Mktg., LLC vLuxury Vacation DealsLLC, 2015 WL 10012987, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 2015). The purpose of the interpleader is for the stakeholder to “protect itself against the problems posed by multiple claimants to a single fund.” Lee vWCoast Life InsCo., 688 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012).

What interpleader asks the court to do

An interpleader action typically involves two stages. Id. In the first stage, the district court decides whether the requirements for a rule or statutory interpleader action have been met by determining if there is a single fund at issue and whether there are adverse claimants to that fund. Id. If the Court finds that the interpleader action has been properly brought, it then makes a determination of the respective rights of the claimants. Id.”)

What the facts here are

Red Rock instructed Steven Scow to interplead $57,282.32 on 8/28/14 which was declared “excess funds” after Red Rock took its fees and the HOA had been paid in full. Red Rock did not have standing in 2021 to file an interpleader action.

Steven Scow concealed his and other’s wrongdoing

Steven Scow concealed his possession of the money and its location. He hid the fact that all named defendants had released their liens before the conclusion of the first action. Scow obscured his obstruction of my claim for the proceeds in the first action by refusing to provide them during mediation. He also hindered my second civil claim for the proceeds by filing a motion to dismiss it with prejudice, citing res judicata and the failure to include the HOA as a necessary party.

Scow further obscured his interference with my quiet title claims in the first two actions by providing inaccurate, incomplete, false, and falsified Red Rock foreclosure records. This prevented the sale from being entirely voided and allowed Nationstar and its co-conspirators to commit fraud on the court by having the sale declared valid regarding the sub-priority.

The attorneys perpetrated fraud on the court, covering up that Red Rock rejected assessments that cured the default three times, the sale would have been fairly voided in its entirety in the 1st action, and we would not be still litigating four years later without a judge ever looking at the evidence.

I was the sole claimant after June 3, 2019

3/12/15 Wells Fargo released the lien of the 2nd deed of trust

3/28/17 Gordon B. Hansen Trust closed and assigned its title interest to sole beneficiary Nona Tobin as an individual

6/3/19 Nationstar released the lien of the 1st deed of trust

What Judge Peterson believes despite the law and the facts supported by the evidence

She believes there is some unwritten law that says Red Rock doesn’t have to distribute the proceeds after the sale if someone might try to unwind the sale years later.

Judge Peterson buys into Red Rock’s argument so much she argues for them.

Judge Peterson’s argument matches Nationstar’s 4/26/21 argument also when she allowed multiple disinterested entities to oppose the funds being distributed to the sole claimant.

I didn’t file any quiet title claims against Nationstar in the 1st action and Nationstar didn’t file any against me.

I wanted the sale to be void to return to our respective positions. Nationstar filed for summary judgment against the Hansen trust, but not against me as an individual, met ex arte with the judge, got me removed as an individual party and got all my evidence suppressed, lied to the court to say that it was BANA’s successor in interest, then rescinded that claim a week after the end of discover, filed motion after motion to prevent me from being able to return to my pro se status to be able to represent myself or to be the real party in interest after the Hansen Trust was closed, made a fraudulent side deal with Jimijack, filed motions to have me declared a vexatious litigant, opposed the excess proceeds to be distributed to me as the sole claimant, and on and on and on.

Why? Because Nationstar had no standing to foreclose

Because if the sale were voided in its entirety, than Nationstar would have to prove based on evidence that it actually had NRS 104.3301 standing to foreclose, and we both knew it couldn’t.

Thus, by eliminating my involvement, Nationstar obtained $355,000 for releasing the lien on the 1st deed of trust, which they falsely claimed to own from non-party Joel A. Stokes, on June 3, 2019, just two days prior to the show trial in the 1st action – a trial that neither Joel Stokes nor Nationstar were required to attend, and from which I was barred – all documentary evidence and witnesses were excluded.

For the result of a meritless interpleader action to be the preclusion of all the victim’s claims and the imposition of a vexatious litigant restrictive order for forced defense against entities who have no standing is unfair and disproportionate.

Judge Peterson’s bias gifted the case to my opponents

Steven Scow filed the interpleader action knowing it was meritless

Link to previous blogs ( on how this interpleader action was filed in bad faith because the law required ALL proceeds be distributed AFTER THE SALE, no one but me had standing to make a claim after June 3, 2019 and Scow got my 6/3/20 civil claim for the proceeds dismissed with prejudice before he sued me and four other defendants without standing on February 16, 2021 to interplead the excess proceeds he should have distributed in 2014.

Interpleader requires single fund, neutral stakeholder, and adverse claimants

This case: wrongfully withheld funds, misidentified, implicated holder joined by disinterested opponents to attack single claimant with standing

Pruco Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, Case No.: 2:11-cv-00186-GMN-GWF, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 16, 2011) (“Procedurally, an interpleader action encompasses two stages: First the district court decides whether the requirements for rule or statutory interpleader action have been met by determining if there is a single fund at issue and whether there are adverse claims to the fund. In the second stage the court makes a determination of the respective rights of the claimants. Mack v. Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d 1010, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2010). (citing Rhoades v. Casey, 196 F.3d 593 (5th Cir. 1999)). 28 U.S.C. § 1335 allows a stakeholder, “to file an interpleader action to protect itself against the problems posed by multiple claimants to a single fund.” Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ensley, 174 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1999). ”)

Nevada case law supports sanctions for filing a meritless interpleader action knowing there is only one claimant and the other have no standing

Filing a meritless interpleader action could be sanctionable if the filer attorney has knowingly unlawfully held one person’s money and the other defendants have no standing to make a claim. Sanctions may be appropriate if the filer acted in bad faith, recklessly, or vexatiously, or if the action is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Michelman v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 685 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Interpleader is proper when a stakeholder has at least a good faith belief that there are conflicting colorable claims.”)

“See Tise, 234 F.3d at 426-27; Wells Fargo Bank v. PACCAR Fin. Corp., No. 1:08-CV-00904 AWI SMS, 2009 WL 211386, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 28, 2009). Further, “[b]ecause the interpleader plaintiff is supposed to be disinterested in the ultimate disposition of the fund, attorneys’ fee awards are properly limited to those fees that are incurred in filing the action and pursuing the plan’s release from liability, not in litigating the merits of the adverse claimants’ positions.””

Several of the cases cited here suggest that filing a meritless interpleader action could be sanctionable. For example, in Lee v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., the Ninth Circuit discussed the principle that interpleader is not available to a party who has knowingly accepted funds subject to competing claims. This suggests that if an attorney files an interpleader action knowing that one of the defendants has no standing to make a claim, the attorney could be subject to sanctions. Additionally, in Mayorga v. Ronaldo, the court discussed its authority to sanction an attorney for bad faith conduct, including under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which authorizes an award of fees and costs against an attorney whose reckless conduct causes a litigant to incur them. This authority could be used to argue that filing a meritless interpleader action could be sanctionable if the filer acted in bad faith, recklessly, or vexatiously. Several other cases, such as Crawford v. Smith’s Food & Drug Store, Inc. and Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Seiu Local 24/7, discuss the circumstances under which attorneys’ fees may be awarded as a sanction for bad faith conduct. These cases suggest that sanctions may be appropriate if the interpleader action is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Equitable doctrine of ‘clean hands’ applies to interpleader actions

Lee v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012) (““It is generally recognized that interpleader ‘developed in equity and is governed by equitable principles.’ ” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bayona,223 F.3d 1030, 1033–34 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Lummis v. White,629 F.2d 397, 399 (5th Cir.1980), rev’d on other grounds by Cory v. White,457 U.S. 85102 S.Ct. 232572 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh,119 F.3d 415, 418 (6th Cir.1997) (“[I]nterpleader is fundamentally equitable in nature.”)). Accordingly, many courts have held that those who have acted in bad faith to create a controversy over the stake may not claim the protection of interpleader. See, e.g., Kent v. N. Cal. Reg’l Office of Am. Friends Serv. Comm.,497 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir.1974) (“Interpleader, which is an equitable remedy, is not available to one who has voluntarily accepted funds knowing they are subject to competing claims.”) (citations omitted); Farmers Irrigating Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Kane,845 F.2d 229, 232 (10th Cir.1988) (“It is the general rule that a party seeking interpleader must be free from blame in causing the controversy, and where he stands as a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter of the suit or any of the claimants, he cannot have relief by interpleader.”) (collecting cases); see also44B Am. Jur. 2d Interpleader § 7 (“The equitable doctrine of ‘clean hands’ applies to interpleader actions. The party seeking interpleader must do equity, not have caused the conflicting claims, and be free from blame in causing the controversy.”) (footnotes omitted).”)

Scow used interpleader to cover up his wrongdoing

On 2/16/21 Scow, concealed that he personally had unlawfully withheld the excess proceeds that Red Rock had instructed him to remit to the court on 8/28/14.

This is conversion, not interpleader

Scow caused summons to be served in the name of his client, Plaintiff FirstService Residential Nevada LLC (EIN 88-0358132) dba Red Rock Financial Services, a partnership (“Red Rock”)(whose partners he refused to disclose in discovery in the 1st action) when he knew Red Rock had no standing to file an interpleader complaint as it didn’t have the money and it didn’t face adverse competing interests. Scow served five defendants knowing that four of the five defendants had no standing to claim the interpleaded funds.

I know of no legal way for Scow to take a check made out to the court and transfer it under his own personal proprietary control, particularly since Red rock ceased to be a fiduciary agent for Sun City Anthem in 2015. Under the bylaws of that HOA, Red Rock had to surrender all of the funds that it had on account collected under the statutory authority of SCA to the SCA Board in April 2015.

Nevertheless, Judge Peterson insisted that this was an ordinary interpleader action and I was not allowed to have any other claims against Steven Scow.

Scow unlawfully withheld $3,500 from the $57,282.32 that Red Rock had designated as “excess funds” knowing that the statute specifically does not authorize any attorney fees to be deducted from the amount designated as “excess” to file an interpleader complaint.

Judge Peterson, by granting a non-party’s motion, dismissed my 3/8/21 AACC, all counter- and cross-claims and affirmative defenses, including unclean hands, with prejudice, without requiring Red Rock to respond

On 3/8/21 I, Nona Tobin, as an individual, filed the only timely answer, affirmative defenses, and compulsory counterclaims, including a claim for the proceeds. My 19 affirmative defenses listed unclean hands at number 11.

  1. Failure to state a claim
  2. Estoppel
  3. Fraud NRS 207.360 (9)(30)(35), NRS 205.395, NRS 205.377, NRS 205.330, NRS 205.405, NRS 111.175,
  4. Illegality NRS 207.230
  5. Waiver
  6. Failure to join a necessary party
  7. General and equitable defenses
  8. Priority
  9. False claims to title (NRS 205.395, NRS 205.377)
  10. Violation of Covenant of good faith (NRS 116.1113)
  11. Equitable doctrines (unclean hands, NRS 207.360 (9)(30)(35)
  12. Acceptance (distribution of proceeds)
  13. Waiver and Estoppel (Red Rock & Nationstar)
  14. Fraudulent Misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment NRS 205.405, NRCP 11.pdf
  15. Failure to mitigate damages
  16. Unconstitutional (Due process clauses)
  17. Statutory violations (NRS 116.31031, NRS 116.31162 – NRS 116.31168 (2013), NRS 116.3102, NRS 116.31083, NRS 116.31085, NRS 38.310
  18. Rejection of two super-priority payments (SCA 513 and SCA 302)
  19. Violations of HOA CC&Rs owner protections (CC&Rs 7.4 Compliance & Enforcement; CC&Rs 16: Dispute Resolution and Limitation on Litigation

Judge Peterson did not dismiss Nationstar and Wells Fargo when they failed to make any compulsory counter-claims and did not answer my cross-claims

On 4/12/21, I filed a motion for an order to distribute the proceeds with interest to me as the sole claimant but Judge Peterson disregarded the law and let disinterested entities oppose me

On 4/26/21/ Judge Peterson let non-claimants Nationstar and Wells Fargo oppose the funds going to the sole claimant as long as I had other claims

Judge Peterson let Red Rock join the disinterested banks’ opposition even though Red Rock was supposed to be neutral

Red Rock’s/Scow’s true motives, and the banks’ collusion, for not distributing the proceeds after the sale, should now be apparent, but in case it’s not I’ll do a separate blog on that.

Scow knows that the banks are not going to make a claim for the proceeds and that if he can keep the owner from making a claim, then he can keep them, and the money trail will be virtually impossible to follow.

Being forced to pay attorney fees to Scow given his bad faith conduct is just plain wrong. He should be audited to account for the excess proceeds that were not distributed after the red Rock sales.

Mayorga v. Ronaldo, 2:19-cv-00168-JAD-DJA, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 14, 2023) (“The American Rule recognizes that each party in litigation must bear its own attorney’s fees in the absence of a rule, statute, or contract authorizing an award of fees.”)

“Courts usually award attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff in interpleader actions absent a showing of bad faith. Schirmer Stevedoring Co. v. Seaboard Stevedoring Corp., 306 F.2d 188, 194-95 (9th Cir. 1962).” Here, however, bad faith abounds, and attorney fees are definitely not appropriate.

Judge Peterson’s impartiality can reasonably be questioned by declaring Red Rock LLC was a party

The court can’t render judgment for or against a non-party

Moore v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., No. 69367, at *2 (Nev. App. Jan. 13, 2017) (“the district court entered judgment on this un-asserted claim without conducting a trial (and without employing any recognized trial substitute such as NRCP 12(c) or 56). Instead, the court simply resolved all pending factual and legal disputes on its own, in chambers, without hearing the sworn testimony of any witnesses, without applying any rules of evidence or any recognized procedures for admitting evidence, without permitting the parties to assert any objections to any evidence, without permitting any cross-examination of any witness by any party, and without identifying the legal standards used to resolve any factual or legal disputes, and without entering findings of fact and conclusions of law.”)

Moore v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., No. 69367, at *2 (Nev. App. Jan. 13, 2017) (“The district court clearly erred by failing to apply the Nevada Revised Statutes, the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, and applicable precedent from our supreme court, and by entering judgment without a trial in favor of a party that never even pled a claim for relief”)

Moore v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., No. 69367, at *3 n.2 (Nev. App. Jan. 13, 2017) (“Booke was not a party to the case, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to enter any judgment against him. See NRCP 4(d); Schwob v. Hemsath, 98 Nev. 293, 294, 646 P.2d 1212, 1212 (1982) (“Without proper service of process the district court acquires no. jurisdiction over a party.”) (citing Brockbank v. District Court, 65 Nev. 781, 201 P.2d 299 (1948); State v. District Court, 51 Nev. 206, 273 P. 659 (1929)). ”)

“A district court may render judgment for or against a person only where the court has jurisdiction over the parties. C.H.A. Venture v. G. C. Wallace Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 106 Nev. 381, 383, 794 P.2d 707, 708 (1990). Thus, a court may not enter a judgment for or against a nonparty.”

NRCP 10(a)(1) The complaint must name all the parties

10(a) Caption; Names of Parties. Every pleading must have a caption with the court’s name, the county, a title, a case number, and a Rule 7(a) designation. The caption of the complaint must name all the parties; the caption of other pleadings, after naming the first party on each side, may refer generally to other parties.

NRCP Rule 10. Form of Pleadings

Pacific States Sec. Co. v. District Court, 48 Nev. 53 (Nev. 1924)

“Parties are those who are named as such in the record, and who are properly served with process, or enter their appearance. 20 R.C.L. p. 662; Womach v. City of St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 100 S.W. 443, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 140.”

A party must file an appearance, and no attorney ever appeared for Red Rock LLC

A court does not have jurisdiction over non-parties

I.C.A.N. Foods, Inc. v. Sheppard (In re Aboud Inter Vivos Trust), 314 P.3d 941, 946 (Nev. 2013) (“Young v. Nev. Title Co., 103 Nev. 436, 442, 744 P.2d 902, 905 (1987) (“A court does not have jurisdiction to enter judgment for or against one who is not a party to the action.””)

Red Rock LLC did not intervene as a timely motion and an interest in the proceedings would have been required.

Non-party Red Rock LLC never timely filed the required NRCP 24(a)(2) motion to intervene. It could not assert it had an interest it did not have relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, i.e., it never had any relationship to the HOA, the interpleaded proceeds, or this dispute, other than sharing an attorney and a similar name with the Plaintiff.

The 2/3/21 complaint must identify ALL the parties per NRCP 10a1 and Red Rock LLC is NOT named as the Plaintiff

Red Rock LLC did not serve any summons to claim relief as the plaintiff

I filed the only counter- and cross-claims, and I did not serve any claims against Red Rock LLC.

C.H.A. Venture v. G.C. Wallace Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 106 Nev. 381, 384, 794 P.2d 707, 709 (1990) (“Personal service or a legally provided substitute must still occur in order to obtain jurisdiction over a party.”). Moreover, “[a] district court is empowered to render a judgment either for or against a person or entity only if it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter,” and a district court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a party—even one with actual notice of the proceedings—unless that party has first been adequately served.

Red Rock LLC is not, therefore, a counter-defendant just because Scow added an LLC designation to counter-defendant in the caption.

No party timely responded to my 3/8/21 claims so I filed 1st 4/12/21 motion for the proceeds

No party timely (NRCP 12(a)(1)(B) responded to my 3/8/21 claims so I filed a 4/15/21 motion for summary judgment

Counter -claims require a timely responsive pleading (NRCP 12(a)(1)(B))

(B) A party must serve an answer to a counterclaim or crossclaim within 21 days after being served with the pleading that states the counterclaim or crossclaim.

Rule 12.(a) Time to Serve a Responsive Pleading.

4/16/21 Scow filed a rogue, unsupported NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss on behalf of non-party Red Rock LLC the day after I filed my MSJ because no party filed a timely answer to my 3/8/21 AACC.

12/28/21 Non-party Red Rock LLC filed an improper opposition to my motion for an evidentiary hearing and a motion for vexatious litigant restrictive order against me and motions for attorneys fees when it had no standing to be in the case

6/13/22 Non-party Red Rock LLC filed an improper opposition to my 2nd motion for the proceeds with interest and penalties for being wrongfully withheld 8+ years and another motion for a vexatious litigant restrictive order against me for moving to correct the orders for the party identification and another motion for legal fees.

Judge Peterson granted the non-party’s 6/13/22 motion for attorney fees but Scow didn’t accurately write the 1/9/23 order

I insisted that my opposition be added and a corrected order was filed on 1/16/23

1/23/23 I filed motion to reconsider this 1/16/23 order because it was granting the motion of a non-party and because it did not deny my prior 6/27/22 motion to strike the rogue filings of non-party Red Rock LLC in an written appealable order.

State, Div. Child Fam. Servs. v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 445, 452 (Nev. 2004) (“[p]rior to the entry of a final judgment the district court remains free to reconsider and issue a written judgment different from its oral pronouncement.” Consequently, we stated that “[a]n oral pronouncement of judgment is not valid for any purpose; therefore, only a written judgment has any effect, and only a written judgment may be appealed.””)

2/10/23 I filed an order granting these motions as unopposed

2/15/23 court denied because of ex parte hearing I knew nothing about

Judge Peterson just ex parte declared “Red Rock is a party” and I’m a vexatious litigant and the court rules don’t apply to my opponents

1/23/23 motions ask for equal treatment of non-parties to fairly end this dispute

Judge Peterson allowed Scow to write the order. The order misrepresents the motion to reconsider as “frivolous” and violating the court’s admonitions.

It is not improper to move to strike the rogue filings of a non-party. It is asking for equal treatment.

CAI minuscule minority dominates public policy again by pushing anti HOA owner SB 417

How does CAI convince legislators to take actions that are detrimental to HOA homeowner rights?

CAI uses attorneys as lobbyists pretending to be fiduciaries speaking in the best interest of the HOA.

CAI lobbyist Adam Clarkson pushed through SB 417- Whistleblower Robert Stern called him on it before the SCA May Board vote

Former Board member Forrest Quinn asked if SCA would ever have fair Board elections given Adam Clarkson’s interference

George K. Staropoli’s HOA Constitutional Government blog shows that the tiny CAI trade group has prevailed for years

Voluntary recusal is the high road and the path of least resistance, but for Judge Peterson, it is also the road not taken. Why?

Judge Peterson refused to recuse herself from the decision about whether to vacate ex parte vexatious litigant restrictive order. Why?

12/19/22 Tobin motion for an order to show cause (“MOSC”) why written finding of attorney misconduct should not be forwarded to the State Bar to avoid Tobin having to file separate civil actions because the State Bar will not investigate the complaints without a court order that contains written findings. The MOSC was supported by Requests for judicial notice of the uninvestigated complaints and the draft civil actions that would have to be filed separately if this court declined to file

3/28/23 order as it was adopted without notice or opportunity to oppose

Tobin’s opposition that Judge Peterson steadfastly refused to allow to be attached to the 3/28/23 order rendering it virtually impossible to appeal

Tobin’s 4/26/23 motion to disqualify Judge Peterson as her impartiality can reasonably be questioned due to improper ex parte communications and acting outside her jurisdiction and conduct in the hearings that showed she made decisions by relying solely on the misrepresentations of opposing counsels and without consideration of Tobin’s evidence. Chief Judge is requested to set aside Judge Peterson’s orders on t from the decision to set aside the orders first on jurisdictional grounds and then on Rules 59 and/or 60 misconduct of the prevailing parties.

5/3/23 Judge Peterson’s affidavit misstates the court record including misrepresenting who the parties are, stating that the case is over, the appeal period is over, but that she can be fair and handle any decisions that are remaining. Given that by refusing to recuse herself is the only way she can guarantee that her extraordinarily harsh and damaging orders against me, that prevent my title claims from ever being adjudicated based on evidence, can stand, why is she insisting on it? What’s in it for her?

5/10/23 Non-party Red Rock LLC’s opposition to my 4/26/23 motion reiterates the same false version of history that omits the fact that there has never been an evidentiary adjudication of anyone’s claims in this case ever and omits the basic fact that he filed the interpleader action in bad faith knowing that Red Rock didn’t have standing to file it, the legal standard for interpleader was not met, and I was the only person with standing to file a claim for the interpleaded proceeds since 6/3/19 before the show trial in the 1st action.

Tobin’s 5/20/23 Declaration and Reply to Steven Scow’s and Judge Peterson’s Opposition to Judge Peterson’s recusing herself from the decision to set aside the 3/28/23

Voluntary recusal is both the high road and the path of least resistance, but for Judge Peterson, it is also the road not taken. Why?

July 7, 2022 hearing

On 7/7/22, Judge Peterson heard Nona Tobin’s 2nd motion to distribute the interpleaded proceeds to her as the sole claimant with interest and penalties, -1½ years after she failed to hear Tobin’s 1st motion and a year after she granted non-party Red Rock LLC’s Tobin to dismiss Tobin’s unheard, unopposed claims of Conversion, Racketeering, and Fraud with prejudice on the grounds of res judicata.

Judge Peterson also heard Tobin’s motion to correct three prior orders to accurately identify the names of the parties and to attach Tobin’s opposition to factual inaccuracies in the orders.

The judge also accepted and granted the rogue motion of non-party Red Rock LLC’s for attorney fees, and granted the improper renewed motion for a vexatious litigant restrictive order against Tobin.

Judge Peterson granted non-party Red Rock LLC’s motion for attorney’s fees, denied Tobin’s unopposed motions.

Judge Peterson told Tobin that nothing Tobin said (in her unopposed proposed order has any merit by misconstruing the 6/30/22 appellate court ruling of the prior action in this dispute where the dismissal with prejudice of Tobin’s 2nd civil claim for these proceeds was affirmed on the grounds of res judicata and privity, bound this court to preclude all Tobin’s claims of Conversion, Fraud, and Racketeering). The court decided Tobin has no claims except for the interpleaded funds, had no right to interest or penalties, and that Steven Scow did nothing wrong by withholding her money for 8+years and because he held it in trust so it was harmless error.