What allegations of attorney misconduct were made against Sun City Anthem Attorneys

On 12/19/22, I filed a motion for an order to show cause why written findings of attorney misconduct should not be forwarded to the State Bar against David Ochoa and Adam Clarkson that was accompanied by a Request for Judicial Notice of a complaint filed with the State Bar.

The complaint had not been investigated by the State Bar as shown below. I had to get a court order with written findings before they would investigate these allegations.

Their actions prevented my quiet title case from being resolved fairly in 2017-2019.

They covered up the fraud of the HOA’s former agents by lying to the court and framing me.

  1. David Ochoa, Lipson Neilson P. C., under direction from Adam Clarkson, The Clarkson Law Group, were the lawyers for Sun City Anthem Community Association, Inc., party in the first action who presented the falsified Red Rock foreclosure files to the court and misrepresented them as if they were the HOA’s concealed official records SCA’s attorneys filed a meritless motion for summary judgment to quiet a title in which the HOA held no interest and supported it with the falsified Red Rock records. SCA’s attorneys defamed Tobin and unlawfully removed her from her elected position on the HOA Board for being a party to the quiet title litigation of a house she inherited and have pursued a relentless campaign of harassment and retaliation against her over the past five years both for being a litigant herein and for being a whistleblower about other unrelated HOA matters.
  2. SCA attorneys usurped the statutory authority of the HOA Board to enforce, and to impose fines and sanctions for alleged violations of, the HOA’s governing documents according to the terms of the Act (NRS 116). SCA attorneys obstructed Tobin’s access to Alternate Dispute Resolution (CC&Rs XVI, NRS 38.310) and then used abusive, potentially criminal (NRS 199.480(2)(c), NRS 199.210, NRS 193.130(d), NRS 199.145) litigation tactics to obstruct her ability to fully and fairly litigate her civil claims.
  3. SCA attorneys acted in bad faith and did not serve the interests of the HOA or the common good of the HOA membership at large. The attorneys acted for their own self-interest (Clarkson) or in the interest of other parties (Clarkson and Ochoa), e.g., Sandy Seddon, Red Rock or the HOA’s insurance carrier
  4. Defendant Ochoa made false statements to the court on at least these dates 3/28/17 RTRAN, 4/27/17 RTRAN, 5/23/17 RTRAN, 5/25/17 RTRAN, 3/26/19 RTRAN, 5/29/19 RTRAN, 9/3/19 RTRAN,  9/10/19 video, 9/10/19 minutes, submitted a false document to the court on these dates: 3/22/17, 3/27/17, 3/31/17, 4/18/17, 9/20/17. 4/20/182/5/19, 3/6/19, 4/18/19, 5/2/19, 5/24/19, 5/31/19, 8/8/19, 8/9/19, 8/22/19, 11/22/19, 3/30/20, 7/1/20, or improperly withheld material information from the court on at least these dates: 5/31/18, 2/11/19, 2/26/19, 2/26/19, and caused serious injury to Tobin as an individual, and caused a significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
  5. Ochoa knew that this phrase that he wrote into the 4/18/19 order was false,

“The totality of the facts evidence that the HOA properly followed the processes and procedures in foreclosing upon the Property”.

  • All documentary evidence, including declarations under penalty of perjury and sworn affidavits, put before the court on, inter alia, these dates: 9/23/16, 1/31/17, 3/3/17, 2/9/18, 5/31/18, 7/13/18, 12/5/18, 2/7/19, 2/12/19, 2/20/19, 2/26/19, 2/26/9, 2/27/19, 2/28/19. 2/28/19, 4/10/19, 4/12/19, 4/17/19, 4/24/19, 4/29/19, 5/23/19, 8/20/19, 8/26/19 – support the Tobin/Hansen Trust claims. However, the court relied solely on misrepresentations and false evidence by Ochoa and other opposing counsels, to adopt the erroneous orders entered on 4/18/19, 5/31/19 and 6/24/19.
  • Despite knowing the order was based on the false evidence Ochoa himself produced or the true evidence that he himself concealed and withheld, Ochoa and/or other attorneys under his direction, repeatedly relied on it in meritless filings and court hearings that succeeded in obstructing a fair adjudication of Tobin’s claims based solely on verified evidence on at least these dates: 4/27/17 RTRAN, 5/23/17 RTRAN, 5/25/17 RTRAN, 3/26/19 RTRAN, 5/29/19 RTRAN, 9/3/19 RTRAN,  9/10/19 video, 9/10/19 minutes, 3/22/17, 3/27/17, 3/31/17, 4/18/17, 9/20/17. 4/20/182/5/19, 5/31/18, 2/11/19, 2/26/19, 2/26/19,
  • The order, authored by Ochoa, entered on 5/31/19, contains the false statements, completely unsupported by any verified evidence, (See EXHIBIT C of 3/6/22 Bar complaint.) that:

“The substantial exhibits that have been submitted in this case demonstrate that Nona Tobin as Trustee of the Trust was aware of the foreclosure and did nothing to stop the foreclosure. The May 2, 2019 (sic) Order, without addressing superpriority, establishes the HOA had a valid lien and properly noticed the foreclosure sale.”

  • Pages 48 to 55 of the draft complaint against Ochoa and Clarkson delineate the false evidence they entered into the court record primarily via records obtained from Steven Scow.
  • Exhibit A: Ochoa Obstructed Settlement
  • Exhibit C: Misrepresented and Suppressed Evidence
  • Exhibit D: Concealed Evidence
  • Exhibit E: Disclosed false & falsified evidence
  • Exhibit E-1 Disputed facts in Red Rock foreclosure file in SCA 176 – 643
  • Exhibit E-2 Examples of false evidence
  • Exhibit E-3 Red Rock Foreclosure file is false, falsified and disclosed as SCA 176-643
  • Exhibit F: Filed non-meritorious claims
  • Exhibit G: Concealed there were no Valid Board Actions
  • Exhibit G-1 Limits on closed HOA Board meetings
  • EXHIBIT G-2: SCA Board did not comply with HOA meeting laws
  • EXHIBIT G-3: SCA Board secretly sold a dozen houses in 2014
  • EXHIBIT G-4 SCA Board did not properly authorize any foreclosures conducted by Red Rock Financial Services in SCA 2012-2014 agendas and minutes excerpted for items related to foreclosure or debt
  • Exhibit G-5 is 5/23/19 Exhibit 5 “No valid board authorization for the sale” was misrepresented by David Ochoa and ignored by the court
  • Exhibit H – More disputed facts in the order (NEO 4/18/19) that granted the HOA MSJ and Nationstar joinder

Clarkson unlawfully removed me from my elected seat on the SCA Board in 2017 and has obstructed my running every year since

Who controls CAI and its 50 state HOA lobbying committees?

HOAGOV reprint Who controls CAI and its 50 state HOA lobbying committees?

by George K. Staropoli, first published 3/11/12

I believe this shows that a tiny group of attorneys and HOA managers have for more than a decade crushed the rights of millions of HOA homeowners by convincing legislators nationwide that they were speaking for the best interests of HOA homeowners when they were really the mouthpiece for the trade association of the HOA managers, attorneys and other agents who “service” the HOAs for their own enrichment.

CAI minuscule minority dominates public policy again by pushing anti HOA owner SB 417

How does CAI convince legislators to take actions that are detrimental to HOA homeowner rights?

CAI uses attorneys as lobbyists pretending to be fiduciaries speaking in the best interest of the HOA.

CAI lobbyist Adam Clarkson pushed through SB 417- Whistleblower Robert Stern called him on it before the SCA May Board vote

Former Board member Forrest Quinn asked if SCA would ever have fair Board elections given Adam Clarkson’s interference

George K. Staropoli’s HOA Constitutional Government blog shows that the tiny CAI trade group has prevailed for years

Voluntary recusal is the high road and the path of least resistance, but for Judge Peterson, it is also the road not taken. Why?

Judge Peterson refused to recuse herself from the decision about whether to vacate ex parte vexatious litigant restrictive order. Why?

12/19/22 Tobin motion for an order to show cause (“MOSC”) why written finding of attorney misconduct should not be forwarded to the State Bar to avoid Tobin having to file separate civil actions because the State Bar will not investigate the complaints without a court order that contains written findings. The MOSC was supported by Requests for judicial notice of the uninvestigated complaints and the draft civil actions that would have to be filed separately if this court declined to file

3/28/23 order as it was adopted without notice or opportunity to oppose

Tobin’s opposition that Judge Peterson steadfastly refused to allow to be attached to the 3/28/23 order rendering it virtually impossible to appeal

Tobin’s 4/26/23 motion to disqualify Judge Peterson as her impartiality can reasonably be questioned due to improper ex parte communications and acting outside her jurisdiction and conduct in the hearings that showed she made decisions by relying solely on the misrepresentations of opposing counsels and without consideration of Tobin’s evidence. Chief Judge is requested to set aside Judge Peterson’s orders on t from the decision to set aside the orders first on jurisdictional grounds and then on Rules 59 and/or 60 misconduct of the prevailing parties.

5/3/23 Judge Peterson’s affidavit misstates the court record including misrepresenting who the parties are, stating that the case is over, the appeal period is over, but that she can be fair and handle any decisions that are remaining. Given that by refusing to recuse herself is the only way she can guarantee that her extraordinarily harsh and damaging orders against me, that prevent my title claims from ever being adjudicated based on evidence, can stand, why is she insisting on it? What’s in it for her?

5/10/23 Non-party Red Rock LLC’s opposition to my 4/26/23 motion reiterates the same false version of history that omits the fact that there has never been an evidentiary adjudication of anyone’s claims in this case ever and omits the basic fact that he filed the interpleader action in bad faith knowing that Red Rock didn’t have standing to file it, the legal standard for interpleader was not met, and I was the only person with standing to file a claim for the interpleaded proceeds since 6/3/19 before the show trial in the 1st action.

Tobin’s 5/20/23 Declaration and Reply to Steven Scow’s and Judge Peterson’s Opposition to Judge Peterson’s recusing herself from the decision to set aside the 3/28/23

Voluntary recusal is both the high road and the path of least resistance, but for Judge Peterson, it is also the road not taken. Why?

July 7, 2022 hearing

On 7/7/22, Judge Peterson heard Nona Tobin’s 2nd motion to distribute the interpleaded proceeds to her as the sole claimant with interest and penalties, -1½ years after she failed to hear Tobin’s 1st motion and a year after she granted non-party Red Rock LLC’s Tobin to dismiss Tobin’s unheard, unopposed claims of Conversion, Racketeering, and Fraud with prejudice on the grounds of res judicata.

Judge Peterson also heard Tobin’s motion to correct three prior orders to accurately identify the names of the parties and to attach Tobin’s opposition to factual inaccuracies in the orders.

The judge also accepted and granted the rogue motion of non-party Red Rock LLC’s for attorney fees, and granted the improper renewed motion for a vexatious litigant restrictive order against Tobin.

Judge Peterson granted non-party Red Rock LLC’s motion for attorney’s fees, denied Tobin’s unopposed motions.

Judge Peterson told Tobin that nothing Tobin said (in her unopposed proposed order has any merit by misconstruing the 6/30/22 appellate court ruling of the prior action in this dispute where the dismissal with prejudice of Tobin’s 2nd civil claim for these proceeds was affirmed on the grounds of res judicata and privity, bound this court to preclude all Tobin’s claims of Conversion, Fraud, and Racketeering). The court decided Tobin has no claims except for the interpleaded funds, had no right to interest or penalties, and that Steven Scow did nothing wrong by withholding her money for 8+years and because he held it in trust so it was harmless error.

Violation of NCJC 2.6 as grounds for disqualification

Violation of NCJC 2.6 as grounds for disqualification

I contend that Judge Peterson violated NCJC 2.6 by

  • refusing to conduct the evidentiary hearing that was ordered for 8/18/21,
  • denying my 12/14/21 motion for an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes about the findings in the 9/10/21 and 11/30/21 orders that I allege covered up the criminal actions of my oppoenents vis-a-vis their abuse of the HOA quiet title litigation process to steal from many victims,
  • dismissing my unanswered 3/8/21 claims of Conversion, Fraud, and Racketeering and my petitions for sanctions vs. Red Rock and Nationstar with prejudice without making my opponents meet their burden of proof
  • exempting my opponents from timely (NRCP 12(a)(1)(B)) filing a responsive pleading to my claims and granting an untimely, rogue motion to dismiss from a non-party.

Legal authorities supporting the proposition that a judge must allow a party to present evidence to support her case

Fact finding is the “basic responsibility” of trial courts “rather than appellate courts.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982) (quoting DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 n.22 (1974)); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (“appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues”).

Myers v. Haskins, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 51, 8-9 (Nev. App. 2022) (“evidentiary hearings are designed with this purpose in mind: to resolve disputed questions of fact. See DCR 13(6) (recognizing that disputed factual points may be resolved at evidentiary hearings); EDCR 5.205(g) (providing that exhibits attached to motions do not constitute substantive evidence unless admitted); cf. Nev. Power Co. v. Fluor III., 108 Nev. 638, 644-45837 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1992) (recognizing that conducting an evidentiary hearing is the only way to properly resolve questions of fact concerning whether to dismiss a party’s suit as a discovery sanction)”)

An evidentiary hearing is required to establish fraud upon the court (NRCP 60(d)(3))

Milam v. Stealth Holdings, LLC, 381 P.3d 641 (Nev. 2012) (“NC–DSH, Inc. v. Garner,125 Nev. 647, 657218 P.3d 853, 860–61 (2009)(providing that “[i]t is only after a proper hearing in which the fraud [upon the court] has been established by clear and convincing evidence that relief can be granted.” (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted));”)

List of filings I made that contained evidence that Judge Peterson refused to admit or consider

The list is long because, I believe, Judge Peterson unfairly refused to allow me to assert my actual claims. She kept insisting that all my claims were precluded and nothing was before her but the question of who the interpleaded funds belonged to.

I say that Steven Scow filed the interpleader action in bad faith, knowing that it was meritless and unwarranted and that neither Plaintiff Red Rock nor non-party Red Rock LLC had standing to either pursue and interpleader action nor oppose the court ordering interpleaded funds being distributed to me with interest and penalties for being wrongfully withheld for 8+ years.

My claims for Conversion, Fraud, and Racketeering and petitions for sanctions were compulsory counter-claims that should have been granted as unopposed because Red Rock did not file any timely responsive pleading and non-party Red Rck LLC’s motion to dismiss was rogue, untimely, and contained exhibits which the court would have to have considered to make a claims preclusion ruling which would have nessecarily converted it to an MSJ, meaning the factual disputes would have had to have been resolved on a NRCP 56 standard and it could not have been granted as a NRCP 12(b)(5). Further, she refused my motion to amend one time under NRCP 15 for no good reason and didn’t sua spinte move for a more definitive statement if she thought it wasn’t pled to 9(b) standard. She just obviously wanted to be rid of it and me.

3/8/21 unanswered counter- & cross-claims and four requests for judicial notice of the property record, my unadjudicated claims, relevant laws and Sun City Anthem governing documents, and disputed facts in the prior court record (false evidence filed and recorded by my opponents to get the prior courts to bless the theft of my property)

Doc ID# 14 Nona Tobin’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Answer And Counter-Claim vs. Red Rock Financial Services, Cross-Claims Vs. Nationstar Mortgage LLC And Wells Fargo, N.A., And Motion For Sanctions vs. Red Rock Financial Services And Nationstar Mortgage LLC, and/or Nationstar Mortgage dba Mr. Cooper Pursuant To NRCP 11(b)(1)(2)(3) and/or(4), NRS 18.010(2), NRS 207.407(1), NRS 42.005

Doc ID# 15 Request for Judicial Notice
Nona Tobin’s Request for Judicial Notice of the Complete Official Clark County 2003-2021 Property Records for APN 191-13-811-052

Doc ID# 18 Nona Tobin’s Request for Judicial Notice of Relevant Unadjudicated Civil Claims and Administrative Complaints

Doc ID# 19 Nona Tobin’s Request for Judicial Notice of the Nevada Revised Statutes, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct and Sun City Anthem Governing Documents Germane To the Instant Action

Doc ID# 21 Nona Tobin’s Request for Judicial Notice of NRCP 16.1 Disclosures /Subpoena Responses from Discovery in Case A-15-720032-C and Disputed Facts in the Court Record
12/14/21 motion for an evidentiary hearing and replies to Nationstar’s and non-party Red Rock LLC’s opposition and their improper counter-motin for abuse of process and for an unwarranted vexatious litigant restrictive order against me
Doc ID# 75 Nona Tobin’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing to Set Aside Orders and for Sanctions Pursuant to NRCP 60(B)(3) and (D)(3), NRS 18.010(2) and EDCR 7.60 (1) and (3)

Doc ID# 80 Nona Tobin’s Reply to Red Rock Financial Services LLC’s Opposition to Nona Tobin’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing to Set Aside September 10, 2021 Order and November 30, 2021 Orders Pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(3) (Fraud) and NRCP 60(b)(3) (Fraud on the Court) and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Cots Pursuant to EDCR 7.60(1) and (3), NRS 18.010(2); and, Countermotion for Abuse of Process for a Vexatious Litigant Restrictive Order Against Nona Tobin and for Attorney Fees and Costs

Doc ID# 81 Nona Tobin’s Reply To Nationstar’s And Wells Fargo’s Joinder And Countermotions For Attorney Fees And A Vexatious Litigant Order

12/19/22 motion for an order to show cause why written findings of attorney misconduct should not be forwarded to the State Bar of Nevada for disciplinary action

Doc ID# 103 Tobin Motion for An Order to Show Cause Why Written Findings of Attorney Misconduct Should Not Be Forwarded To The State Bar of Nevada

Doc ID# 108 Corrected Motion for an Order to Show Cause Why Written Findings of Attorney Misconduct Should Not be Forwarded to the State Bar

Doc ID# 102 Request for Judicial Notice Verified Complaints of Attorney Misconduct filed with the State Bar of Nevada vs. Brittany Wood

Doc ID# 104 Request for Judicial Notice Verified Complaint of Attorney Misconduct Filed with The State Bar of Nevada Vs. Steven Scow

Doc ID# 105 Request for Judicial Notice Verified Complaints of Attorney Misconduct Filed with the State Bar of Nevada vs. Melanie Morgan, Esq. (SBN 8215), Akerman, LLP; and Wright, Finlay, Zak, LLP, and Draft Alternative Civil Action

Doc ID# 106 Request for Judicial Notice Verified Complaint of Attorney Misconduct Filed With The State Bar of Nevada Vs. Joseph Y. Hong

Doc ID# 107 Request for Judicial Notice Verified Complaints of Attorney Misconduct Filed With The State Bar of Nevada Vs. David Ochoa, Esq. (SBN 10414) and Adam Clarkson, Esq.

Legal research question

Is a final judgment order unfairly entered if the court does not allow one side to present its opposition given that appellate courts generally defer to the district court’s findings of fact ?

Nevada courts generally defer to the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. However, a final judgment order may be unfairly entered if the court does not allow one side to present its opposition, misapplies the law, or makes findings not supported by evidence.

Several of the cases I found emphasize the importance of allowing both sides to present their cases in order to ensure a fair trial. For example, in Milam v. Stealth Holdings, LLC, the court discusses the requirement that parties be “fully heard” on an issue before a district court can grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Similarly, in Solinger v. Solinger, the court reiterates that a district court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly erroneous, and that substantial evidence is required to sustain a judgment. Other cases I found highlight the importance of correctly applying the law in order to avoid an unfair judgment. For example, in Long Valley L. D. Co. v. Hunt, the court held that a judgment must be reversed when the court misapplies a rule of law or erroneously places the burden of proof on the losing party. In KY Invs. NV v. King of Condos, Inc., the court discusses the importance of a district court providing a statement of reasons when granting summary judgment, in order to allow for meaningful appellate review.

Finally, a few cases I found emphasize the deference given to district court findings of fact on appeal. For example, in Pickens v. McCarran Mansion, LLC, the court notes that appellate courts are bound by the district court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Similarly, in Bonnell v. Lawrence, the court reiterates that the remedy for legal error is by timely motion or appeal, not by independent action for relief from judgment.

How to disqualify a judge

The Nevada Revised Statutes define the grounds and procedure for disqualification

NRS 1.230 outlines the grounds for disqualification, which include both actual and implied bias.

NRS 1.235 sets out the procedure for disqualification, including the requirement to file an affidavit specifying the grounds for disqualification.

The Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC) also provides guidance

The Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC) also provides guidance on when a judge should disqualify themselves. NCJC Rule 1.2 requires judges to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary, and NCJC Rule 2.11(A) requires judges to disqualify themselves when their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Violating NCJC does not promote confidence in the judiciary and creates a situation where the judge’simpartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Implicated NCJC provisions in my case

Rule 1.1.  Compliance With the Law.  A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Rule 1.2.  Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary.  A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.

Rule 2.2.  Impartiality and Fairness.  A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.

Rule 2.6.  Ensuring the Right to Be Heard.

      (A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.

Rule 2.9.  Ex Parte Communications.

      (A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter, except as follows:

      (1) When circumstances require it, ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, which does not address substantive matters, is permitted, provided:

             (a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication; and

             (b) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and gives the parties an opportunity to respond.

      (B) If a judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing upon the substance of a matter, the judge shall make provision promptly to notify the parties of the substance of the communication and provide the parties with an opportunity to respond.

      (C) A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.

Rule 2.11.  Disqualification.

      (A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:

      (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.

      Rule 2.15.  Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct.

(C) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that another judge has committed a violation of this Code shall take appropriate action.      

(D) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct shall take appropriate action.

Standard of review for assessing if the grounds for disqualification are met

The standard for assessing whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned is whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would reach that conclusion.

The motion for disqualification must contain affidavits that meets this burden of proof that a reasonable person would also question the judge’s impartiality.

However, the burden of proof is on the movant as the judge is presumed to be unbiased.

“This court gives substantial weight to a judge’s decision not to recuse herself and will not overturn such a decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Goldman v. Bryan, 104 Nev. 644, 649, 764 P.2d 1296, 1299 (1988), abrogated on other grounds by Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 266, 163 P.3d 428, 443 (2007). A judge is presumed to be unbiased, and “the burden is on the party asserting the challenge to establish sufficient factual grounds warranting disqualification.” Id. at 649, 764 P.2d at 1299.

Impact of a disqualification motion

In Debiparshad v. The Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 71 (Nev. 2021), the Nevada Supreme Court outlined the requirements for disqualification under the NCJC and relevant case law.

(“In Towbin Dodge, we noted that NCJC Rule 2.11, which requires a judge to “disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” does not contain a procedural mechanism for enforcement. Id. at 257, 259, 112 P.3d at 1067, 1069. We specified the procedure for moving to disqualify a judge pursuant to NCJC Rule 2.11, explaining that, as with an affidavit filed under NRS 1.235, a motion to disqualify under NCJC Rule 2.11 must include the facts upon which the disqualification is based and must be referred to another judge for decision. Id. at 260-61, 112 P.3d at 1069-70see also Turner v. State, 114 Nev. 682, 687962 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1998) (applying, without discussion, the NRS 1.235 procedural requirements to a motion to disqualify under both the statute and the NCJC). ”)

Debiparshad v. The Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 71, 8 (Nev. 2021) 
How Debiparshad and Towbin Dodge support my case is two-fold:

1) the subject judge (Peterson in my case) can take no further action in the case until the motion to disqualify is resolved, and

2) the disqualification decision must be made by another judge.

This comes as positive news since it would be unreasonable to anticipate Judge Peterson recusing herself now, after 2+ years of ruling against me without any factual or legal justification. This includes her recent actions at an improperly noticed hearing held ex parte, where she issued an unwarranted vexatious litigant bench order against me in absentia, which was converted into a final judgment denying all my motions without notice, good cause, or an opportunity for opposition.

Why this drastic action is necessary rather than just filing an appeal

The order submitted on March 28, 2023, was composed in a manner that made obtaining a precise understanding of the facts and law nearly unattainable for the reviewing court. The judge followed the common practice of having opposing counsel draft the order, resulting in significant misrepresentation of material facts and legal matters. Appellate courts assume that the facts are unchallenged if the order states as such, and no opposition is present within the record.

My previous losses have occurred under these circumstances, where orders are written to suggest that the evidence and the law support the opposing argument.

My motion is timely to void all A-21-828840-C orders

My motion is timely to void all Judge Peterson’s orders as new grounds emerged due to the refusal to allow the 3/28/23 order to accurately reflect that it was issued ex parte without notice, just cause or an opportunity to ppose.

“[I]f new grounds for a judge’s disqualification are discovered after the time limits in NRS 1.235(1) have passed, then a party may file a motion to disqualify based on [Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 ] as soon as possible after becoming aware of the new information.”

Towbin, 121 Nev. at 256, 112 P.3d at 1067.

Judge Peterson’s impartiality canreasonably questioned be as these provisions of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct are alleged to have been violated.

The required affidavit with supporting evidence will be filed first to the Commission on Judicial Discipline as it has a Nevada Constitutional mandate to ensure that the Nevada judiciary complies with the NCJC.

Rule 1.2.  Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary.  A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.

Rule 2.2.  Impartiality and Fairness.  A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.

Rule 2.6.  Ensuring the Right to Be Heard.

      (A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.

Rule 2.7.  Responsibility to Decide.  A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, except when disqualification is required by Rule 2.11 or other law.

Rule 2.9.  Ex Parte Communications.

      (A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter, except as follows:

      (1) When circumstances require it, ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, which does not address substantive matters, is permitted, provided:

             (a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication; and

             (b) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and gives the parties an opportunity to respond.

      (2) A judge may obtain the written advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the judge, if the judge gives advance notice to the parties of the person to be consulted and the subject matter of the advice to be solicited, and affords the parties a reasonable opportunity to object and respond to the notice and to the advice received.

      (3) A judge may consult with court staff and court officials whose functions are to aid the judge in carrying out the judge’s adjudicative responsibilities, or with other judges, provided the judge makes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the record, and does not abrogate the responsibility personally to decide the matter.

      (4) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to settle matters pending before the judge.

      (5) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider any ex parte communication when authorized by law to do so.

      (B) If a judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing upon the substance of a matter, the judge shall make provision promptly to notify the parties of the substance of the communication and provide the parties with an opportunity to respond.

      (C) A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.

      (D) A judge shall make reasonable efforts, including providing appropriate supervision, to ensure that this Rule is not violated by court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control.

      Rule 2.11.  Disqualification.

      (A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:

      (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.

      Rule 2.15.  Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct.

      (A) A judge having knowledge that another judge has committed a violation of this Code that raises a substantial question regarding the judge’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.

      (B) A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.

      (C) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that another judge has committed a violation of this Code shall take appropriate action.

      (D) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct shall take appropriate action.

Standard for Review

Other jurisdictions offer guidance on the standard of review as well

In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the reviewing court should inquire into a variety of factors including, but not limited to, the nature of the judge’s conduct, the tone and demeanor of the judge, the scope of the judicial conduct in the context of the length and complexity of the case and issues therein, the extent to which the judge’s conduct was directed at one side more than the other, and the presence of any curative instructions, either at the time of an inappropriate occurrence or at the entry of the final order. When the issue is preserved so that the true facts are known and a reviewing court determines that the judge’s conduct pierced the veil of judicial impartiality, the court may not apply harmless-error review. Rather, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

A-21-828840-C orders are void

If the judge is disqualified because judicial impartiality can be reasonably questioned,

“Disqualification occurs when the facts creating disqualification arise, not when disqualification is established.”); see also Hoff v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 79 Nev. 108, 110, 378 P.2d 977, 978 (1963) (“That the actions of a district judge, disqualified by statute, are not voidable merely, but void, has long been the rule in this state.”); Frevert v. Smith, 19 Nev. 363, 11 P. 273 (1886) (“[T]he general effect of the statutory prohibitions … [is] to render those acts of a judge involving the exercise of judicial discretion, in a case wherein he is disqualified from acting, not voidable merely, but void.”). ”

Debiparshad v. The Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 71, 9-10 (Nev. 2021)

9/10/2021 Doc ID# 43 “Order & Judgment On Plainiff (Sic) Red Rock Financial Services, LLC’s Motion To Dismiss Counterclaimant Nona Tobin’s Counterclaim And Petition For Sanctions And Defendants/ Counterclaimant Nona Tobin’s Motion For Summary Judgement And Motion For Sanctions”

11/30/2021 Doc ID# 70 Order Clarifying Sept. 10th, 2021 Order and Mooting Notice of Default and Motion to Strike

11/30/2021 Doc ID# 71 Order Denying Nona Tobin’s Motion to Reconsider of Order Dismissing Nona Tobin’s Counterclaim and Petition for Sanctions and Defendant/ Counter-claimant Nona Tobin’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Sanctions

5/25/2022 Doc ID# 88 Order Denying Nona Tobin’s Motion For An Evidentiary Hearing To Set Aside 9/10/21 Order And 11/30/21 Orders Pursuant To NRCP 60(b)(3)(Fraud) And NRCP 60(d)(3)(Fraud On The Court) And Motion For Attorneys’ Fees And Costs Pursuant To EDCR 7.60(1) And (3), NRS 18.010(2); And, Denying non-party Red Rock LLC’s 12/28/21 Countermotions For Abuse Of Process and Denying non-party Red Rock LLC’s motion For A Vexatious Litigant Restrictive Order Against Nona Tobin And denying For Attorney Fees And Costs

1/9/2023 01/09/2023 Order Doc ID# 115 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Nona Tobin’s Second Amended Motion for an Order to Distribute Interpleaded Funds with Interest to Sole Claimant Nona Tobin and Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.010(2) and EDCR 7.60(b)(1) and (3) and Motin to Correct Nunc Pro Tunc Notices of Entry of Orders Entered on November 30 2021 and May 25 2022 and Granting in Part Red Rock Financial Services’ Countermotion for Abuse of Process; for a Vexatious Litigant Restrictive Order Against Nona Tobin and for Attorney Fees and Costs

1/16/2023 Doc ID# 117 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Nona Tobin’s Second Amended Motion for an Order to Distribute Interpleaded Funds with Interest to Sole Claimant Nona Tobin and Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.010(2) and EDCR 7.60(b)(1) and (3) and Motion to Correct Nunc Pro Tunc Notices of Entry of Orders Entered on November 30 2021 and May 25 2022 and Granting in Part Red Rock Financial Services’ Countermotion for Abuse of Process; for a Vexatious Litigant Restrictive Order Against Nona Tobin and for Attorney Fees and Costs

What allegations of attorney misconduct were made against Steven Scow, the attorney for Red Rock Financial Services?

Complaint summary as filed to the State Bar online on 3/1/22

Link to 12/19/22 Request For Judicial Notice of 346-page verified, evidence-backed, uninvestigated (pending court order) complaint to the State Bar and 50-page draft civil complaint requesting a court order for written findings of attorney misconduct (that will be necessary if this court does not refer the matter to the State Bar for investigation)

This resulted in me being declared a vexatious litigant and a restrictive order being entered against me without notice or a chance to oppose.

Link to PDF of 3/28/23 order filed without notice or opposition

I have tried unsuccessfully repeatedly for the last few weeks to get my opposition attached to the order so it is accurate enough for appeal.

HOA attorneys and managers fail in their fiduciary duty to the HOA

HOA attorneys and managers are by law fiduciaries to the HOA that employs them. However, they routinely act in their own self-interest rather than solely and exclusively in the interest of the HOA.

The HOA homeowners are the intentional third-party beneficiaries of the CC&Rs contract in that the HOA exists for the purpose of maintaining the common areas, the community lifestyle and the property values of for the common good of the HOA membership at large.

The attorney and the manager are agents. They have no authority over the Board. Anything they assert over the Board is usurped, and that is the problem.

SB 417 will exacerbate the problem of attorneys and other agents enriching themselves by improper control over HOA Boards

My experience shows HOA attorneys lie with impunity to the courts now. The State Bar Assosication does not enforce the ethical codes of conduct. The Nevada Supreme Court thinks that’s okay. The judges let them write orders that misrepresent the facts, the evidence and the law.

Why should NRED or the Ombudsman for Owners in Common-Interest Communities be any different? Why investigate any homeowner’s complaints ever?

Adam Clarkson already has the Ombudsman in his pocket

…Or else, how has he kept my complaints from being heard by the Commission for Common Interest Communities for the last six years?

After all, it has been enough for the past six years for the NRED to not investigate my complaints and the Ombudsman not to refer them to the Commission SOLELY because Adam Clarkson, the Community Association Institute lobbyist and Sun City Anthem’s debt collector and attorney, says I’m are just a “bad person” and not the kind that should be allowed to serve on the Board of Directors because I complained about things like how much over market the manager is paid?

Link to unanswered 9/2/17 NRED Form 514a

Link to my unanswered 1/31/18 Affidavit regarding Clarkson’s denial of records request related to Sandy Seddon’s salary that I filed with Investigator Christina Pitch who was assigned to investigate three NRED Form 530s. (If SB 417 is passed, it will be legal for Clarkson to deny this request and legal for NRED to refuse to investigate it. But then, the homeowner can be criminalized and threatened with high-cost litigation for even asking.)

9/7/17 NRED Form IA 530 re Interference with the Recall election was resolved by NRED’s very thoughtful 8/8/18 letter below.

9/7/17 NRED Form IA 530 re Clarkson’s declaring my elected seat on the Board vacant “by operation of law” rather than by the mandatory NRS 116.31036 removal election was resolved by NRED’s very thoughtful 8/8/18 letter below.

9/7/17 NRED Form IA 530 re Clarkson’s spearheading bullying, retaliation, and harassment was resolved by NRED’s very thoughtful 8/8/18 letter below.

8/8/18 NRED’s dismissal of the three Form 530s without prejudice, ignoring the Form 530 and ignoring Clarkson’s obstruction of the legitimate access to information about employee salaries.