On 7/7/22, Judge Peterson heard Nona Tobin’s 2nd motion to distribute the interpleaded proceeds to her as the sole claimant with interest and penalties, -1½ years after she failed to hear Tobin’s 1st motion and a year after she granted non-party Red Rock LLC’s Tobin to dismiss Tobin’s unheard, unopposed claims of Conversion, Racketeering, and Fraud with prejudice on the grounds of res judicata.
Judge Peterson also heard Tobin’s motion to correct three prior orders to accurately identify the names of the parties and to attach Tobin’s opposition to factual inaccuracies in the orders.
The judge also accepted and granted the rogue motion of non-party Red Rock LLC’s for attorney fees, and granted the improper renewed motion for a vexatious litigant restrictive order against Tobin.
Judge Peterson granted non-party Red Rock LLC’s motion for attorney’s fees, denied Tobin’s unopposed motions.
Judge Peterson told Tobin that nothing Tobin said (in her unopposed proposed order has any merit by misconstruing the 6/30/22 appellate court ruling of the prior action in this dispute where the dismissal with prejudice of Tobin’s 2nd civil claim for these proceeds was affirmed on the grounds of res judicata and privity, bound this court to preclude all Tobin’s claims of Conversion, Fraud, and Racketeering). The court decided Tobin has no claims except for the interpleaded funds, had no right to interest or penalties, and that Steven Scow did nothing wrong by withholding her money for 8+years and because he held it in trust so it was harmless error.
Violation of NCJC 2.6 as grounds for disqualification
I contend that Judge Peterson violated NCJC 2.6 by
refusing to conduct the evidentiary hearing that was ordered for 8/18/21,
denying my 12/14/21 motion for an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes about the findings in the 9/10/21 and 11/30/21 orders that I allege covered up the criminal actions of my oppoenents vis-a-vis their abuse of the HOA quiet title litigation process to steal from many victims,
dismissing my unanswered 3/8/21 claims of Conversion, Fraud, and Racketeering and my petitions for sanctions vs. Red Rock and Nationstar with prejudice without making my opponents meet their burden of proof
exempting my opponents from timely (NRCP 12(a)(1)(B)) filing a responsive pleading to my claims and granting an untimely, rogue motion to dismiss from a non-party.
Legal authorities supporting the proposition that a judge must allow a party to present evidence to support her case
Fact finding is the “basic responsibility” of trial courts “rather than appellate courts.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982) (quoting DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 n.22 (1974)); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (“appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues”).
Myers v. Haskins, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 51, 8-9 (Nev. App. 2022) (“evidentiary hearings are designed with this purpose in mind: to resolve disputed questions of fact. See DCR 13(6) (recognizing that disputed factual points may be resolved at evidentiary hearings); EDCR 5.205(g) (providing that exhibits attached to motions do not constitute substantive evidence unless admitted); cf. Nev. Power Co. v. Fluor III.,108 Nev. 638, 644-45, 837 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1992) (recognizing that conducting an evidentiary hearing is the only way to properly resolve questions of fact concerning whether to dismiss a party’s suit as a discovery sanction)”)
An evidentiary hearing is required to establish fraud upon the court (NRCP 60(d)(3))
Milam v. Stealth Holdings, LLC, 381 P.3d 641 (Nev. 2012) (“NC–DSH, Inc. v. Garner,125 Nev. 647, 657, 218 P.3d 853, 860–61 (2009)(providing that “[i]t is only after a proper hearing in which the fraud [upon the court] has been established by clear and convincing evidence that relief can be granted.” (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted));”)
List of filings I made that contained evidence that Judge Peterson refused to admit or consider
The list is long because, I believe, Judge Peterson unfairly refused to allow me to assert my actual claims. She kept insisting that all my claims were precluded and nothing was before her but the question of who the interpleaded funds belonged to.
I say that Steven Scow filed the interpleader action in bad faith, knowing that it was meritless and unwarranted and that neither Plaintiff Red Rock nor non-party Red Rock LLC had standing to either pursue and interpleader action nor oppose the court ordering interpleaded funds being distributed to me with interest and penalties for being wrongfully withheld for 8+ years.
My claims for Conversion, Fraud, and Racketeering and petitions for sanctions were compulsory counter-claims that should have been granted as unopposed because Red Rock did not file any timely responsive pleading and non-party Red Rck LLC’s motion to dismiss was rogue, untimely, and contained exhibits which the court would have to have considered to make a claims preclusion ruling which would have nessecarily converted it to an MSJ, meaning the factual disputes would have had to have been resolved on a NRCP 56 standard and it could not have been granted as a NRCP 12(b)(5). Further, she refused my motion to amend one time under NRCP 15 for no good reason and didn’t sua spinte move for a more definitive statement if she thought it wasn’t pled to 9(b) standard. She just obviously wanted to be rid of it and me.
3/8/21 unanswered counter- & cross-claims and four requests for judicial notice of the property record, my unadjudicated claims, relevant laws and Sun City Anthem governing documents, and disputed facts in the prior court record (false evidence filed and recorded by my opponents to get the prior courts to bless the theft of my property)
Doc ID# 14 Nona Tobin’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Answer And Counter-Claim vs. Red Rock Financial Services, Cross-Claims Vs. Nationstar Mortgage LLC And Wells Fargo, N.A., And Motion For Sanctions vs. Red Rock Financial Services And Nationstar Mortgage LLC, and/or Nationstar Mortgage dba Mr. Cooper Pursuant To NRCP 11(b)(1)(2)(3) and/or(4), NRS 18.010(2), NRS 207.407(1), NRS 42.005
Doc ID# 15 Request for Judicial Notice Nona Tobin’s Request for Judicial Notice of the Complete Official Clark County 2003-2021 Property Records for APN 191-13-811-052
Doc ID# 18 Nona Tobin’s Request for Judicial Notice of Relevant Unadjudicated Civil Claims and Administrative Complaints
Doc ID# 19 Nona Tobin’s Request for Judicial Notice of the Nevada Revised Statutes, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct and Sun City Anthem Governing Documents Germane To the Instant Action
Doc ID# 21 Nona Tobin’s Request for Judicial Notice of NRCP 16.1 Disclosures /Subpoena Responses from Discovery in Case A-15-720032-C and Disputed Facts in the Court Record
12/14/21 motion for an evidentiary hearing and replies to Nationstar’s and non-party Red Rock LLC’s opposition and their improper counter-motin for abuse of process and for an unwarranted vexatious litigant restrictive order against me
Doc ID# 75 Nona Tobin’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing to Set Aside Orders and for Sanctions Pursuant to NRCP 60(B)(3) and (D)(3), NRS 18.010(2) and EDCR 7.60 (1) and (3)
Doc ID# 80 Nona Tobin’s Reply to Red Rock Financial Services LLC’s Opposition to Nona Tobin’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing to Set Aside September 10, 2021 Order and November 30, 2021 Orders Pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(3) (Fraud) and NRCP 60(b)(3) (Fraud on the Court) and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Cots Pursuant to EDCR 7.60(1) and (3), NRS 18.010(2); and, Countermotion for Abuse of Process for a Vexatious Litigant Restrictive Order Against Nona Tobin and for Attorney Fees and Costs
Doc ID# 81 Nona Tobin’s Reply To Nationstar’s And Wells Fargo’s Joinder And Countermotions For Attorney Fees And A Vexatious Litigant Order
12/19/22 motion for an order to show cause why written findings of attorney misconduct should not be forwarded to the State Bar of Nevada for disciplinary action
Doc ID# 103 Tobin Motion for An Order to Show Cause Why Written Findings of Attorney Misconduct Should Not Be Forwarded To The State Bar of Nevada
Doc ID# 108 Corrected Motion for an Order to Show Cause Why Written Findings of Attorney Misconduct Should Not be Forwarded to the State Bar
Doc ID# 102 Request for Judicial Notice Verified Complaints of Attorney Misconduct filed with the State Bar of Nevada vs. Brittany Wood
Doc ID# 104 Request for Judicial Notice Verified Complaint of Attorney Misconduct Filed with The State Bar of Nevada Vs. Steven Scow
Doc ID# 105 Request for Judicial Notice Verified Complaints of Attorney Misconduct Filed with the State Bar of Nevada vs. Melanie Morgan, Esq. (SBN 8215), Akerman, LLP; and Wright, Finlay, Zak, LLP, and Draft Alternative Civil Action
Doc ID# 106 Request for Judicial Notice Verified Complaint of Attorney Misconduct Filed With The State Bar of Nevada Vs. Joseph Y. Hong
Doc ID# 107 Request for Judicial Notice Verified Complaints of Attorney Misconduct Filed With The State Bar of Nevada Vs. David Ochoa, Esq. (SBN 10414) and Adam Clarkson, Esq.
Legal research question
Is a final judgment order unfairly entered if the court does not allow one side to present its opposition given that appellate courts generally defer to the district court’s findings of fact ?
Nevada courts generally defer to the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. However, a final judgment order may be unfairly entered if the court does not allow one side to present its opposition, misapplies the law, or makes findings not supported by evidence.
Several of the cases I found emphasize the importance of allowing both sides to present their cases in order to ensure a fair trial. For example, in Milam v. Stealth Holdings, LLC, the court discusses the requirement that parties be “fully heard” on an issue before a district court can grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Similarly, in Solinger v. Solinger, the court reiterates that a district court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly erroneous, and that substantial evidence is required to sustain a judgment. Other cases I found highlight the importance of correctly applying the law in order to avoid an unfair judgment. For example, in Long Valley L. D. Co. v. Hunt, the court held that a judgment must be reversed when the court misapplies a rule of law or erroneously places the burden of proof on the losing party. In KY Invs. NV v. King of Condos, Inc., the court discusses the importance of a district court providing a statement of reasons when granting summary judgment, in order to allow for meaningful appellate review.
Finally, a few cases I found emphasize the deference given to district court findings of fact on appeal. For example, in Pickens v. McCarran Mansion, LLC, the court notes that appellate courts are bound by the district court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Similarly, in Bonnell v. Lawrence, the court reiterates that the remedy for legal error is by timely motion or appeal, not by independent action for relief from judgment.
The Nevada Revised Statutes define the grounds and procedure for disqualification
NRS 1.230 outlines the grounds for disqualification, which include both actual and implied bias.
NRS 1.235 sets out the procedure for disqualification, including the requirement to file an affidavit specifying the grounds for disqualification.
The Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC) also provides guidance
The Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC) also provides guidance on when a judge should disqualify themselves. NCJC Rule 1.2 requires judges to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary, and NCJC Rule 2.11(A) requires judges to disqualify themselves when their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Violating NCJC does not promote confidence in the judiciary and creates a situation where the judge’simpartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Implicated NCJC provisions in my case
Rule 1.1. Compliance With the Law. A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Rule 1.2. Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary. A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.
Rule 2.2. Impartiality and Fairness. A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.
Rule 2.6. Ensuring the Right to Be Heard.
(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.
Rule 2.9. Ex Parte Communications.
(A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter, except as follows:
(1) When circumstances require it, ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, which does not address substantive matters, is permitted, provided:
(a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication; and
(b) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and gives the parties an opportunity to respond.
(B) If a judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing upon the substance of a matter, the judge shall make provision promptly to notify the parties of the substance of the communication and provide the parties with an opportunity to respond.
(C) A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.
Rule 2.11. Disqualification.
(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
Rule 2.15. Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct.
(C) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that another judge has committed a violation of this Code shall take appropriate action.
(D) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct shall take appropriate action.
Standard of review for assessing if the grounds for disqualification are met
The standard for assessing whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned is whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would reach that conclusion.
The motion for disqualification must contain affidavits that meets this burden of proof that a reasonable person would also question the judge’s impartiality.
However, the burden of proof is on the movant as the judge is presumed to be unbiased.
“This court gives substantial weight to a judge’s decision not to recuse herself and will not overturn such a decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Goldman v. Bryan, 104 Nev. 644, 649, 764 P.2d 1296, 1299 (1988), abrogated on other grounds by Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 266, 163 P.3d 428, 443 (2007). A judge is presumed to be unbiased, and “the burden is on the party asserting the challenge to establish sufficient factual grounds warranting disqualification.” Id. at 649, 764 P.2d at 1299.
Impact of a disqualification motion
In Debiparshad v. The Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 71 (Nev. 2021), the Nevada Supreme Court outlined the requirements for disqualification under the NCJC and relevant case law.
(“In Towbin Dodge, we noted that NCJC Rule 2.11, which requires a judge to “disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” does not contain a procedural mechanism for enforcement. Id. at 257, 259, 112 P.3d at 1067, 1069. We specified the procedure for moving to disqualify a judge pursuant to NCJC Rule 2.11, explaining that, as with an affidavit filed under NRS 1.235, a motion to disqualify under NCJC Rule 2.11 must include the facts upon which the disqualification is based and must be referred to another judge for decision. Id. at 260-61, 112 P.3d at 1069-70; see also Turner v. State,114 Nev. 682, 687, 962 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1998) (applying, without discussion, the NRS 1.235 procedural requirements to a motion to disqualify under both the statute and the NCJC). ”)
Debiparshad v. The Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 71, 8 (Nev. 2021)
How Debiparshad and Towbin Dodge support my case is two-fold:
1) the subject judge (Peterson in my case) can take no further action in the case until the motion to disqualify is resolved, and
2) the disqualification decision must be made by another judge.
This comes as positive news since it would be unreasonable to anticipate Judge Peterson recusing herself now, after 2+ years of ruling against me without any factual or legal justification. This includes her recent actions at an improperly noticed hearing held ex parte, where she issued an unwarranted vexatious litigant bench order against me in absentia, which was converted into a final judgment denying all my motions without notice, good cause, or an opportunity for opposition.
Why this drastic action is necessary rather than just filing an appeal
The order submitted on March 28, 2023, was composed in a manner that made obtaining a precise understanding of the facts and law nearly unattainable for the reviewing court. The judge followed the common practice of having opposing counsel draft the order, resulting in significant misrepresentation of material facts and legal matters. Appellate courts assume that the facts are unchallenged if the order states as such, and no opposition is present within the record.
My previous losses have occurred under these circumstances, where orders are written to suggest that the evidence and the law support the opposing argument.
My motion is timely to void all A-21-828840-C orders
My motion is timely to void all Judge Peterson’s orders as new grounds emerged due to the refusal to allow the 3/28/23 order to accurately reflect that it was issued ex parte without notice, just cause or an opportunity to ppose.
“[I]f new grounds for a judge’s disqualification are discovered after the time limits in NRS 1.235(1) have passed, then a party may file a motion to disqualify based on [Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 ] as soon as possible after becoming aware of the new information.”
Towbin, 121 Nev. at 256, 112 P.3d at 1067.
Judge Peterson’s impartiality canreasonably questioned be as these provisions of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct are alleged to have been violated.
The required affidavit with supporting evidence will be filed first to the Commission on Judicial Discipline as it has a Nevada Constitutional mandate to ensure that the Nevada judiciary complies with the NCJC.
Rule 1.2. Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary. A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.
Rule 2.2. Impartiality and Fairness. A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.
Rule 2.6. Ensuring the Right to Be Heard.
(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.
Rule 2.7. Responsibility to Decide. A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, except when disqualification is required by Rule 2.11 or other law.
Rule 2.9. Ex Parte Communications.
(A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter, except as follows:
(1) When circumstances require it, ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, which does not address substantive matters, is permitted, provided:
(a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication; and
(b) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and gives the parties an opportunity to respond.
(2) A judge may obtain the written advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the judge, if the judge gives advance notice to the parties of the person to be consulted and the subject matter of the advice to be solicited, and affords the parties a reasonable opportunity to object and respond to the notice and to the advice received.
(3) A judge may consult with court staff and court officials whose functions are to aid the judge in carrying out the judge’s adjudicative responsibilities, or with other judges, provided the judge makes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the record, and does not abrogate the responsibility personally to decide the matter.
(4) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to settle matters pending before the judge.
(5) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider any ex parte communication when authorized by law to do so.
(B) If a judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing upon the substance of a matter, the judge shall make provision promptly to notify the parties of the substance of the communication and provide the parties with an opportunity to respond.
(C) A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.
(D) A judge shall make reasonable efforts, including providing appropriate supervision, to ensure that this Rule is not violated by court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control.
Rule 2.11. Disqualification.
(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
Rule 2.15. Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct.
(A) A judge having knowledge that another judge has committed a violation of this Code that raises a substantial question regarding the judge’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.
(B) A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.
(C) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that another judge has committed a violation of this Code shall take appropriate action.
(D) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct shall take appropriate action.
Standard for Review
Other jurisdictions offer guidance on the standard of review as well
In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the reviewing court should inquire into a variety of factors including, but not limited to, the nature of the judge’s conduct, the tone and demeanor of the judge, the scope of the judicial conduct in the context of the length and complexity of the case and issues therein, the extent to which the judge’s conduct was directed at one side more than the other, and the presence of any curative instructions, either at the time of an inappropriate occurrence or at the entry of the final order. When the issue is preserved so that the true facts are known and a reviewing court determines that the judge’s conduct pierced the veil of judicial impartiality, the court may not apply harmless-error review. Rather, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
A-21-828840-C orders are void
If the judge is disqualified because judicial impartiality can be reasonably questioned,
“Disqualification occurs when the facts creating disqualification arise, not when disqualification is established.”); see also Hoff v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,79 Nev. 108, 110, 378 P.2d 977, 978 (1963) (“That the actions of a district judge, disqualified by statute, are not voidable merely, but void, has long been the rule in this state.”); Frevert v. Smith, 19 Nev. 363, 11 P. 273 (1886) (“[T]he general effect of the statutory prohibitions … [is] to render those acts of a judge involving the exercise of judicial discretion, in a case wherein he is disqualified from acting, not voidable merely, but void.”). ”
Debiparshad v. The Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 71, 9-10 (Nev. 2021)
9/10/2021 Doc ID# 43 “Order & Judgment On Plainiff (Sic) Red Rock Financial Services, LLC’s Motion To Dismiss Counterclaimant Nona Tobin’s Counterclaim And Petition For Sanctions And Defendants/ Counterclaimant Nona Tobin’s Motion For Summary Judgement And Motion For Sanctions”
11/30/2021 Doc ID# 70 Order Clarifying Sept. 10th, 2021 Order and Mooting Notice of Default and Motion to Strike
11/30/2021 Doc ID# 71 Order Denying Nona Tobin’s Motion to Reconsider of Order Dismissing Nona Tobin’s Counterclaim and Petition for Sanctions and Defendant/ Counter-claimant Nona Tobin’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Sanctions
5/25/2022 Doc ID# 88 Order Denying Nona Tobin’s Motion For An Evidentiary Hearing To Set Aside 9/10/21 Order And 11/30/21 Orders Pursuant To NRCP 60(b)(3)(Fraud) And NRCP 60(d)(3)(Fraud On The Court) And Motion For Attorneys’ Fees And Costs Pursuant To EDCR 7.60(1) And (3), NRS 18.010(2); And, Denying non-party Red Rock LLC’s 12/28/21 Countermotions For Abuse Of Process and Denying non-party Red Rock LLC’s motion For A Vexatious Litigant Restrictive Order Against Nona Tobin And denying For Attorney Fees And Costs
1/9/2023 01/09/2023 Order Doc ID# 115 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Nona Tobin’s Second Amended Motion for an Order to Distribute Interpleaded Funds with Interest to Sole Claimant Nona Tobin and Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.010(2) and EDCR 7.60(b)(1) and (3) and Motin to Correct Nunc Pro Tunc Notices of Entry of Orders Entered on November 30 2021 and May 25 2022 and Granting in Part Red Rock Financial Services’ Countermotion for Abuse of Process; for a Vexatious Litigant Restrictive Order Against Nona Tobin and for Attorney Fees and Costs
1/16/2023 Doc ID# 117 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Nona Tobin’s Second Amended Motion for an Order to Distribute Interpleaded Funds with Interest to Sole Claimant Nona Tobin and Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.010(2) and EDCR 7.60(b)(1) and (3) and Motion to Correct Nunc Pro Tunc Notices of Entry of Orders Entered on November 30 2021 and May 25 2022 and Granting in Part Red Rock Financial Services’ Countermotion for Abuse of Process; for a Vexatious Litigant Restrictive Order Against Nona Tobin and for Attorney Fees and Costs
Complaint summary as filed to the State Bar online on 3/1/22
Link to 12/19/22 Request For Judicial Notice of 346-page verified, evidence-backed, uninvestigated (pending court order) complaint to the State Bar and 50-page draft civil complaint requesting a court order for written findings of attorney misconduct (that will be necessary if this court does not refer the matter to the State Bar for investigation)
This resulted in me being declared a vexatious litigant and a restrictive order being entered against me without notice or a chance to oppose.
I have tried unsuccessfully repeatedly for the last few weeks to get my opposition attached to the order so it is accurate enough for appeal.
HOA attorneys and managers fail in their fiduciary duty to the HOA
HOA attorneys and managers are by law fiduciaries to the HOA that employs them. However, they routinely act in their own self-interest rather than solely and exclusively in the interest of the HOA.
The HOA homeowners are the intentional third-party beneficiaries of the CC&Rs contract in that the HOA exists for the purpose of maintaining the common areas, the community lifestyle and the property values of for the common good of the HOA membership at large.
The attorney and the manager are agents. They have no authority over the Board. Anything they assert over the Board is usurped, and that is the problem.
SB 417 will exacerbate the problem of attorneys and other agents enriching themselves by improper control over HOA Boards
My experience shows HOA attorneys lie with impunity to the courts now. The State Bar Assosication does not enforce the ethical codes of conduct. The Nevada Supreme Court thinks that’s okay. The judges let them write orders that misrepresent the facts, the evidence and the law.
Why should NRED or the Ombudsman for Owners in Common-Interest Communities be any different? Why investigate any homeowner’s complaints ever?
Adam Clarkson already has the Ombudsman in his pocket
…Or else, how has he kept my complaints from being heard by the Commission for Common Interest Communities for the last six years?
After all, it has been enough for the past six years for the NRED to not investigate my complaints and the Ombudsman not to refer them to the Commission SOLELY because Adam Clarkson, the Community Association Institute lobbyist and Sun City Anthem’s debt collector and attorney, says I’m are just a “bad person” and not the kind that should be allowed to serve on the Board of Directors because I complained about things like how much over market the manager is paid?
Link to my unanswered 1/31/18 Affidavit regarding Clarkson’s denial of records request related to Sandy Seddon’s salary that I filed with Investigator Christina Pitch who was assigned to investigate three NRED Form 530s. (If SB 417 is passed, it will be legal for Clarkson to deny this request and legal for NRED to refuse to investigate it. But then, the homeowner can be criminalized and threatened with high-cost litigation for even asking.)
9/7/17 NRED Form IA 530 re Interference with the Recall election was resolved by NRED’s very thoughtful 8/8/18 letter below.
9/7/17 NRED Form IA 530 re Clarkson’s declaring my elected seat on the Board vacant “by operation of law” rather than by the mandatory NRS 116.31036 removal election was resolved by NRED’s very thoughtful 8/8/18 letter below.
9/7/17 NRED Form IA 530 re Clarkson’s spearheading bullying, retaliation, and harassment was resolved by NRED’s very thoughtful 8/8/18 letter below.
8/8/18 NRED’s dismissal of the three Form 530s without prejudice, ignoring the Form 530 and ignoring Clarkson’s obstruction of the legitimate access to information about employee salaries.
Judge Peterson ordered Nona Tobin to show cause why her third-party complaint should not be dismissed for failure to serve it within 120 days. Judge Peterson signed an order submitted by Tobin’s attorney voluntarily dismissing the complaint, but kept the hearing on the calendar for another purpose. Judge Peterson wanted to see if Tobin’s counter-claims and cross-claims had been properly served. This seems innocent enough but was it?
For one thing, it cost me $1,300 in attorney fees. Second, all the attorneys and the judge agreed Tobin’s counter-claims had been properly served, but they were all wrong when they said they had been properly answered. No party filed any responsive pleading to my 3/8/21 counter-claims or cross-claims, and Judge Peterson did not let Tobin take anyone’s default.
I was forced to withdraw complaint for lack of timely service because I hired an attorney to conduct an evidentiary hearing that was never held.
Link to PDF of TPC complaint dismissed for lack of service
Nona Tobin is filing a complaint against attorneys for various entities, including Red Rock Financial Services, Nationstar Mortgage, Jimijack Irrevocable Trust, and Sun City Anthem.
Tobin alleges abuse of process, racketeering, fraud, and civil conspiracy in relation to a disputed property sale.
Tobin is the successor trustee of the Gordon B. Hansen Trust, which held title to the property in question until a foreclosure deed transferred title to the alleged purchaser.
Tobin claims that the defendants engaged in various fraudulent practices, including lying to the court, suing the wrong party, and concealing material facts and conflicts.
Tobin is seeking restitution, punitive damages, and sanctions against the defendants.
Tobin has exhausted all administrative remedies, including filing complaints with the Henderson Police Department, the State of Nevada Mortgage Lending Division, the Office of the Nevada Attorney General, and the State Bar of Nevada Ethics & Discipline Panel.
Tobin’s docketing statement was returned unfiled, preventing her from appealing certain orders made by Judge Kishner.
Judge Kishner made several rulings that Tobin alleges were based on misrepresentations by opposing counsel, including granting summary judgment, denying a motion to reconsider, and dismissing Tobin’s claims.
The Nevada Supreme Court ruled that Tobin was not a party to the appeal and lacked jurisdiction to address her claims.
Tobin alleges that opposing counsel violated professional and ethical standards in order to prevent her claims from being adjudicated.
Tobin’s four causes of action include abuse of process, fraud, civil conspiracy, and racketeering.
Tobin alleges that the disputed HOA sale did not extinguish the GBH Trust’s rights to title.
Tobin claims entitlement to the $57,282 undistributed proceeds of the sale.
Tobin argues that her 3/28/17 deed is valid and superior to the Jimijack’s defective 6/9/15 deed and the 5/1/19 deed of Jimijack’s successor Joel Stokes.
Tobin alleges that Nationstar Mortgage LLC’s claims to own the beneficial interest of the disputed Western Thrift Deed of Trust are false.
Tobin seeks to cancel and declare without legal force and effect all instruments, encumbrances, and assignments that were improperly or unlawfully executed.
Tobin seeks attorney fees, costs, exemplary and punitive damages, and restitution and punitive damages for racketeering and fraud.
Tobin requests that the court provide findings of fact to the Nevada Bar Counsel for the Ethics & disciplinary Panel to impose appropriate attorney sanctions.
Tobin alleges that the defendants engaged in racketeering, fraud, and civil conspiracy in relation to a disputed property sale.
Tobin outlines the elements of a civil claim for damages caused by racketeering, and argues that the defendants meet these criteria.
Tobin provides a partial list of the defendants’ “predicate acts” which she argues constitute racketeering activity.
Tobin also alleges that the defendants engaged in abuse of process and civil conspiracy.
Tobin references multiple complaints she has filed with the Nevada Attorney General and the Nevada State Bar, as well as various publications detailing her allegations against the defendants.
Tobin cites relevant Nevada case law to support her claims.
Tobin argues that Nationstar was not owed Hansen’s debt, and that Nationstar does not hold the original note.
Tobin claims that the recorded assignments of the Hansen DEED OF TRUST were false claims to title.
Tobin references multiple complaints she has filed with various agencies, and argues that the defendants violated multiple statutes.
Tobin argues that the defendants’ corrupt business practices are well-documented, and references multiple settlement agreements and consent judgments.
Tobin alleges that the defendants used a “PUD Rider” to scam HOA homeowners.
Tobin questions what it takes to get disbarred in Nevada, and calls out the Nevada Attorney General for not taking action.
Tobin provides information about a complaint she filed with the Nevada Attorney General, including the type of complaint, her contact information, and the details of her complaint against Nationstar.
Tobin requests that BHHS be compelled to provide entries into the Equator system that were not provided, despite a subpoena being issued.
Tobin requests an investigative report to determine whether Nationstar’s claims to own the DOT can be proven, and whether the false affidavits recorded to claim ownership of the $389,000 note rose to the level of criminality.
Tobin requests an investigation into other HOA foreclosures to determine if there is sufficient cause to pursue further investigation.
Tobin provides links to exhibits related to her complaint to the NV Attorney General, which include evidence of fraud, false claims, and misconduct by Nationstar and Akerman attorneys.
Tobin alleges that Akerman attorneys conspired with Joseph Hong and others to steal her property by recording false claims against the title, filing pleadings and motions with false claims, and obstructing her ability to have her quiet title claims fairly adjudicated.
Tobin alleges that Nationstar and its attorneys engaged in abuse of process, racketeering, fraud, and civil conspiracy in relation to a disputed property sale.
Tobin argues that Nationstar is judicially estopped from claiming ownership of the Hansen deed of trust.
Tobin details multiple instances in which she attempted to contact or engage with Nationstar or its attorneys, but was met with resistance or outright obstruction.
Tobin alleges that Nationstar and Jimijack conspired to settle the quiet title dispute without the court examining any evidence, and that the court allowed this fraudulent side deal to stand.
Tobin also references a number of exhibits, transcripts, and videos that she believes support her claims.
Tobin references a Nevada law (AB 284) that makes it a felony to execute, notarize, or record false claims to title.
Tobin argues that six of the 61 recorded claims in the Clark County property record are fraudulent, and that Nationstar is liable for penalties under NRS 205.377.
Tobin alleges that Nationstar evaded detection by voluntarily dismissing its claims before trial, and that its attorney conspired with Jimijack’s attorney to settle the dispute out of court.
Tobin argues that Nationstar made multiple false statements in court filings, including conflicting claims about when it became the beneficiary of the Hansen deed of trust.
Tobin also alleges that Nationstar’s attorney met ex parte with the judge to suppress evidence and obstruct a fair adjudication.
Tobin raises a question about the interpretation of the PUD Rider section F-Remedies, and argues that Nationstar has misapplied this contract provision in order to steal property.
Tobin is requesting help from various individuals and organizations to investigate the problem of HOA debt collectors and banks ripping people off.
Tobin identifies two specific issues: HOA debt collectors using abusive practices to foreclose on properties, and banks lying to the court in order to foreclose on mortgages they don’t own.
Tobin argues that the Nevada Real Estate Division and CICC Ombudsman have failed to enforce state law.
Tobin references a previous HOA corruption case, but argues that the current problem is much larger in scale.
Tobin wants to speak with enforcement agency staff to discuss the investigative research that has already been done.
Tobin discusses how banks are using HOA foreclosures to fraudulently obtain title to properties.
Tobin also discusses how HOA debt collectors are unlawfully retaining proceeds from sales.
Tobin discusses the case of a disputed property sale, in which she alleges abuse of process, racketeering, fraud, and civil conspiracy by various defendants.
Tobin argues that Nevada is poor at regulating sham LLCs, which allows for the proceeds of sales to disappear.
Tobin references the case of SCA hiring Alessi & Koenig, LLC, a company with numerous problems, including the fact that David Alessi was not licensed to practice law in Nevada.
Tobin discusses how A&K dissolved the LLC, hid its assets, and morphed into HOA Lawyers Group.
Tobin argues that HOA boards are often ill-advised by financially conflicted agents.
Tobin discusses how banks are often cheating by claiming to own mortgages they don’t actually own.
Tobin argues that the banks are getting a “second bite of the apple” in HOA foreclosure litigations.
Tobin discusses her own case, in which the HOA sold the house to a Realtor after the bank blocked four legitimate sales.
Tobin argues that the banks are prioritizing getting mortgages on their books over the proceeds of the HOA sale.
Tobin discusses the high costs associated with suing after losing a house for a trivial debt.
Tobin references the Spanish Trail case, in which the owner has not received the proceeds from the sale.
Tobin outlines a number of ways in which the Board of Directors (BOD) of the Sun City Community Association (SCA) mishandled foreclosures in 2014.
Tobin argues that the BOD gave complete control over collections to the manager/debt collector, without any checks and balances.
Tobin claims that the BOD kept everything confidential, did not publish the quarterly delinquency report, and did not provide the fee schedule to homeowners.
Tobin argues that the BOD only listened to the debt collector and did not communicate with the homeowner.
Tobin discusses the legal theory for the BOD’s authority, and argues that the BOD has a fiduciary duty to act solely for the association’s benefit.
Tobin references the case of Joel Stokes vs. Bank of America, in which the two parties reached an agreement to settle all claims.
Tobin argues that Joseph Hong and Melanie Morgan did not warn her of the settlement, and that Judge Kishner blessed the deal.
Tobin alleges that Red Rock’s motion to dismiss her claims was granted, and that all other defendants joined in the motion.
Tobin argues that the court ordered the cancellation and expungement of three notices of lis pendens that she had recorded.
Tobin references requests for attorney’s fees made by the Chiesi and Jimijack defendants.
Tobin alleges that Brody Wight, counsel for Red Rock, filed a motion to dismiss that was not supported by facts or law.
Tobin argues that attorneys from Akerman and Wright Finley Zak conspired with Red Rock to conceal Nationstar’s criminal acts.
Tobin alleges that the attorneys for Nationstar, Sun City Anthem, and Red Rock Financial Services all concealed or withheld documents and falsified evidence.
Tobin references her complaint in case A-21-828840-C, in which she alleges that Melanie Morgan conspired with Joseph Hong to make a covert deal to steal her property.
Tobin alleges that attorneys Melanie Morgan and Forrest Barbee concealed records that would have proved that Nationstar refused to identify the beneficiary of a deed of trust.
Tobin argues that Morgan fabricated standing for Nationstar in order to pursue a case against her.
Tobin alleges that Morgan tricked the court into allowing her and Hong to settle out of court.
Tobin claims that Akerman and Wright Finley Zak attorneys concealed records that would have shown how Nationstar communicated with Red Rock about an HOA sale.
Tobin argues that the attorneys concealed an offer from Nationstar that was rejected by Red Rock.
Tobin alleges that the attorneys made false claims in order to protect Nationstar’s security interest.
Tobin references complaints she filed with the Nevada Attorney General and the Nevada Mortgage Lending Division.
Tobin argues that the State Bar of Nevada declined to take action against the attorneys involved, stating that the matter should be handled by a judge.
Tobin references two Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) that deal with the rights of bona fide purchasers and the transferability of property after the withdrawal or cancellation of a notice of pendency.
Tobin argues that Brittany Wood knows that no claims in prior proceedings were fairly adjudicated.
Tobin claims that Nationstar and Jimijack prevailed without adjudication.
Tobin argues that Brittany Wood knows that her co-conspirators prevailed by deceit.
Tobin alleges that Wood suppressed the preliminary title report and proof of title insurance.
Tobin claims that Wood misrepresented the property record to obscure her clients’ wrongdoing.
Tobin argues that Wood concealed all property records related to the fraudulent actions dispute between Tobin and Nationstar and Joel Stokes.
Tobin claims that Wood knew that Jimijack’s deed was void and that Jimijack’s transfer of title to Joel Stokes was also void.
Tobin argues that Wood knowingly misrepresented her deed as “a wild deed outside the chain of title.”
Tobin alleges that Brittany Wood deliberately damaged her and obstructed her case by misrepresenting a recorded deed.
Tobin argues that her authority to close the Gordon B. Hansen Trust and execute a deed to transfer its sole asset to the sole remaining beneficiary has been uncontradicted in the Clark County official property record since 2017.
Tobin claims that Wood advocated for the preposterous argument that Tobin was in privity with herself as trustee of a trust that was closed in 2017.
Tobin alleges that Wood ignored Jimijack’s defective deed because she knew that the Chiesi deed was the fruit of the poison Jimijack deed tree.
Tobin references three Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) that deal with fraudulent conveyances, knowingly receiving fraudulent conveyances, and conveyances made to defraud prior or subsequent purchasers.
Tobin cites a Nevada Supreme Court case that establishes the requirements for a subsequent purchaser to claim title to land.
Tobin discusses “badges of fraud” that may indicate fraudulent intent.
Tobin claims that Wood ignored all the lis pendens and did not include any of them in the RFJN.
Tobin references two rules of professional conduct for attorneys that Wood allegedly violated.
Tobin is upset that the police department cannot assist her with her case, as they claim it is a civil matter.
Tobin has filed complaints with the Nevada Attorney General, but they have been rejected or referred to other agencies.
Tobin references a Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) that prohibits threats, harassment, and creating a hostile environment in a homeowners association (HOA).
Tobin argues that Clarkson, an attorney, misquoted the law twice in order to exempt himself and Seddon from the anti-bullying law.
Tobin discusses a Nevada HOA retaliation case in which attorneys claim to be exempt from being considered agents of the HOA.
Tobin argues that Clarkson breached his fiduciary duty to the HOA by representing Seddon’s interests instead.
Tobin references several rules of professional conduct that Clarkson allegedly violated.
Tobin alleges that GM Sandy Seddon and CAM Lori Martin violated various statutes and bylaws by withholding records from her.
Tobin is seeking justification for various actions taken by the Board, such as hiring Seddon for a high salary and paying four managers above market rate.
Tobin also wants to know why the Board has not put formal HR systems in place.
Tobin alleges that Seddon and Martin retaliated against her and created a hostile environment after she made requests and complaints in good faith.
Tobin references a study that shows how HOA foreclosures depress the real estate market.
Tobin argues that the HOA debt collectors are scamming homeowners by selling houses in secret to speculators.
Tobin discusses the impact of the mortgage crisis on HOAs in Nevada.
The document discusses a legal complaint filed by Nona Tobin against various defendants, alleging abuse of process, racketeering, fraud, and civil conspiracy in relation to a disputed property sale.
The document references a study that found that HOA foreclosures reduced the value of all Nevada homes by 1.7%, and that the controversy over HOA’s super-priority lien status has decreased the willingness of lenders to lend for the purchase of homes in HOAs.
The document lists various Nevada Revised Statutes that are implicated in the case, including those related to civil practice, remedies, witnesses and evidence, crimes against property, real estate brokers and salespersons, mortgage lending, and trusts.
The document also discusses an interpleader complaint filed by Red Rock Financial Services against Nona Tobin and other defendants, and the subsequent reassignment of the case from Judge Kishner to Judge Jessica K. Peterson.
The document begins by referencing a deed and affidavit of service for Nona Tobin, as well as noting that service on her as a trustee was unnecessary.
It then discusses the closure of the Hansen Trust in 2017, and the transfer of title to Nona Tobin as the sole beneficiary.
The document goes on to mention service on Wells Fargo and Nationstar, and the reasons why these entities will not file claims for excess proceeds.
It also discusses service on Republic Services, and the company’s quick disclaimer of interest.
The document then accuses Steven Scow of filing for interpleader unnecessarily, and calls for Joseph Hong to be disbarred for his misconduct.
Finally, the document references the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and argues that disbarment is appropriate for Hong based on various aggravating factors.
The document begins by noting that Nationstar did not file any claims against Nona Tobin or the Hansen Trust, and that Nationstar never refuted any of Tobin’s claims.
It then references several motions and replies filed by Tobin that were stricken from the record due to misrepresentations made by Nationstar’s attorney, Melanie Morgan, to Judge Kishner.
The document also references a motion for a new trial filed by Tobin that was also stricken from the record due to misrepresentations made by opposing counsel.
It goes on to mention an unheard motion filed by Tobin to vacate an order that granted Nationstar’s limited joinder to the HOA’s motion for summary judgment.
The document then discusses how Nationstar prevailed despite evidence supporting Tobin’s claims, by tricking the court into ignoring the evidence.
It references several exhibits that support Tobin’s claims, including declarations, transaction reports, and records of foreclosures.
The document also discusses how Nationstar refused to produce any documents in response to Tobin’s requests, and how it changed its story about how it acquired the deed of trust.
It goes on to argue that Nationstar does not hold the original Hansen promissory note, and that it attempted to conceal this fact.
Finally, the document discusses how Nationstar, Bank of America, and the HOA all contributed to the wrongful foreclosure on the property.
The document begins by referencing several videos that Tobin has made to simplify and publish evidence supporting her claims.
It then discusses the damages that Tobin has suffered as a result of the fraud, including the loss of a $500,000 house, the theft of $389,000, and the loss of rental profits.
The document also references the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, which the opposing counsels have violated in various ways, such as by making false statements, falsifying evidence, and obstructing access to evidence.
Finally, the document includes a declaration from Tobin under penalty of perjury, in which she states that she has personal knowledge of the facts stated in the document and would testify to them if called to do so.
The document begins by outlining the various exhibits that Tobin has submitted as evidence, which include recorded claims from 2003 to 2021.
Exhibits 1-4 detail various deeds, powers of attorney, and deeds of trust related to the disputed property sale.
Exhibit 5 discusses a disputed lien that Red Rock recorded without notice, which Tobin argues was predatory.
Exhibit 6 discusses a notice of default that Tobin disputes, as well as a rescission of that notice.
Exhibit 7 discusses the HOA foreclosure sale, which Tobin argues was fraudulent and based on false information.
The document also references various instances of misconduct by Red Rock, Nationstar, and other parties, such as concealing information, falsifying records, and rejecting offers to settle the dispute.
The document discusses Nationstar’s lack of candor in response to Tobin’s interrogatories and requests for production.
It also references Nationstar’s rescission of a bogus assignment, which removed any possible claim that Nationstar was the successor in interest to BANA.
Tobin alleges that Nationstar fraudulently reconveyed the property to Joel Stokes in order to defraud the court.
The document also discusses various exhibits that Tobin has submitted as evidence, including requests for notice of liens or defaults, and a substitution of trustee.
Tobin argues that Joseph Hong fraudulently convinced the court that his client’s out-of-court settlement qualified as a settlement of Tobin’s quiet title claims.
The document also references various deeds, liens, and lis pendens that Tobin has recorded in relation to the disputed property sale.
The document begins by referencing an appeal in case 82294.
It then discusses various orders and deeds that are void or have been expunged.
Tobin requests punitive damages under the RICO statutes and wants the unethical attorneys disbarred.
Tobin also asks the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline to postpone formal charges against Judge Kishner in order to give her a chance to prove she was duped by the attorneys.
The document then discusses the need for state civil court reform and recommends a joint investigation by the NV Attorney General, State Bar of Nevada Ethics & Discipline Panel, and the Nevada Commission on Judicial Ethics.
Finally, the document discusses the importance of alternative dispute resolution and how it was not made available to Tobin or the Foundation Assisting Seniors.
The case law in Nevada generally supports the proposition that every litigant has the right to an evidence-based adjudication of their claims by an impartial tribunal. Several cases emphasize the importance of a fair trial or hearing, and the need for litigants to have the opportunity to present their case. Other cases discuss the importance of impartiality in the judicial system, and the various procedural safeguards that are in place to ensure a fair and unbiased tribunal.
Several cases in Nevada emphasize the importance of a fair trial or hearing, and the need for litigants to have the opportunity to present their case. For example, in McDermond v. Siemens, the court discusses the importance of giving litigants a fair opportunity to present their case, including the right to a trial when there is any doubt as to the facts. The court in Miller v. Miller similarly acknowledges that while the district court has discretion in conducting a trial, it must still accord every party the “full right to be heard according to law.” Other cases discuss the importance of impartiality in the judicial system. For example, in Whitehead v. Nevada Com’n on Judicial Discipline, the court discusses the fundamental right of litigants to a fair trial or hearing before an impartial tribunal, and references several U.S. Supreme Court cases that support this principle. The court in Nev. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court also discusses the right to a civil jury trial under the Nevada constitution, and how that right may be waived under certain circumstances. This case thus touches on the right of litigants to have their claims adjudicated by an impartial tribunal. Several cases also discuss the various procedural safeguards that are in place to ensure a fair and unbiased tribunal. For example, in SOC LLC v. Rodriguez, the court cites a Nevada statute that requires a reviewing court to inquire whether an agency’s factual determinations are reasonably supported by evidence, and emphasizes the importance of a fair and impartial hearing.
“As stated by Justice Traynor, [The] litigant has a right to objective consideration of all proper evidence by triers of fact without violations of any substantial rights he may have as a litigant. He is entitled not to a trial free of all possible error but to a trial free of harmful error. . . . . . . . [Where] the error is so forceful as to leave its mark on the judgment, the trial itself [is] contaminated.” “Retrial is a small price to pay for insuring the right to a fair trial.”
“”Our judicial system guarantees every defendant a fair trial with impartial jurors deciding a case only on admissible evidence presented in court. Conduct which erodes these basic tenets will be presumed prejudicial.””
“Further, “public policy dictates that cases be adjudicated on their merits.” Kahn, 108 Nev. at 516, 835 P.2d at 794. However, “[l]itigants and their counsel may not properly be allowed to disregard process or procedural rules with impunity.”
“A court should exercise great care in granting summary judgment.” “NRCP 56 authorizes summary judgment only where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and no genuine issue remains for trial. See Short, cited above; Bader Enterprises, Inc. v. Becker, 95 Nev. 807, 809, 603 P.2d 268 (1979); Lipshie v. Tracy Investment Co., 93 Nev. 370, 375, 566 P.2d 819 (1977); Nevada Land Mtge. v. Hidden Wells, 83 Nev. 501, 506, 435 P.2d 198 (1967). A litigant has a right to trial where there is the slightest doubt as to the facts. Short, cited above.”
A vexatious litigant restrictive order was lifted in the Jones case
We conclude that the district court may restrict a litigant from filing petitions and motions that challenge a judgment of conviction or the litigant’s custody status pursuant to a judgment of conviction and that the guidelines set forth in Jordan adequately protect a litigant’s rights while providing instruction for the district courts as to when a restrictive order is warranted and the proper scope of a restrictive order. A court imposing access restrictions on a vexatious litigant with respect to filings that involve post-conviction challenges to a judgment of conviction or computation of time served pursuant to a judgment of conviction must: (1) provide notice of and an opportunity to oppose the proposed restrictions; (2) create an adequate record that includes a list of the filings or other reasons that led it to conclude that a restrictive order is needed, including consideration of other less onerous sanctions to curb the repetitive or abusive activities; (3) make substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant’s actions; and (4) narrowly tailor the restrictions to address the specific problem and set an appropriate standard by which to measure future filings. Under the facts presented in this case, we conclude that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it determined that Jones was a vexatious litigant and entered an order restricting his access to the court. We therefore grant the petition.”
Vexatious litigant restrictive order limits my rights to NRS 116.4117 civil action
3/28/23 The court declared that my filings requesting written finding of attorney misconduct be forwarded to the State Bar against HOA, debt collector, real estate speculator and bank attorneys were vexatious and so I am prohibited from filing any civil action against any defendant for any cause of action until I get approval from the Chief Judge.
4/26/23 I filed a motion to disqualify the judge and set aside the order. There will be a hearing on 5/25/23 @ 10 AM
These should be viewed through an anti-SLAPP lens
SB 417 is designed to limit my free speech, to continue to restrict my rights to serve on the HOA Board by giving Clarkson firepower
Clarkson ordered me to cease and desist asking about Sandy Seddon’s salary, is that what this SB 417 change fixes?
What benefit does a lack of transparency give to anyone other than overpaid managers and attorneys? Why, if the HOA exists for the benefit of the owners, does adding a charge to the owners to provide information in email or electronic format make sense?
Failed in good faith to respond? Refused in good faith to provide? Seriously?
Why is this written only in one direction? Why isn’t’ it written to be bilateral? Why isn’t the attorney, manager of Board member prohibited from retaliating against anybody?
Clarkson regularly tries to shut down the blogs that don’t support Sandy Seddon. Here’s how SB 417 is designed to silence criticism when strong arm tactics like cease & desist letters fail:
Accuse the blogger of defamation, regardless of whether she is speaking the truth. Force her to pay attorneys to defend herself.
Clarkson has unlawfully kept me off the Board for six years already. Now he’s changing the law to make it legal.
The Ombudsman is supposed to be for the Owners in common interest communities – not the fixer for the attorneys and managers
Court records show that the interpleader action was meritless as it was filed when I was the sole party with a recorded claim after June 3, 2019.
The statute NRS 116.31164(3)(c)(2013) required that all the proceeds from the August 15, 2014 HOA foreclosure sale be distributed in a specified manner by the person conducting the sale.
Red Rock’s attorney’s failure to comply with the law and Red Rock’s instructions caused years of litigation and enabled bank fraud.
The law required all the proceeds to be distributed after the sale in 2014, but Red Rock didn’t do that and forced years of litigation to claim money that was rightfully mine and enabled massive fraud on the court by other parties as a result. When Red Rock sued me in a meritless interpleader action, I fought back with fraud, racketering and conversion claims. No party answered so I filed a motion for summary judgment, but then a nonparty filed a motion to dismiss per res judicata which the court granted while denying my motion for summary judgment on the grounds that there were disputed facts and my claims were precluded anyway and she didn’t need to address my claim for the proceeds as long as I was attempting to unwind the sale on appeal.
Red Rock filed a successful motion to dismiss my claim for those proceeds on June 23, 2020 on the grounds of NRCP 12(b)(5) (res judicata) (even though the excess funds from the 2014 sale had not been distributed as required by the statute NRS 116.31164(3)(c)(2013) and NRCP 12(b)(6)(failure to join the HOA as a necessary party to protect its interest in the excess proceeds (despite the fact that Red Rock had paid the HOA in full $2,701.04 on 8/21/04 (according to HOA records that Red Rock falsified in discovery).
Plaintiff Red Rock did not have standing to file 2/3/21 interpleader complaint
Plaintiff Red Rock Financial Services was referred to as “RRFS” in the complaint, but as “Red Rock” elsewhere throughout the case, and as “RRFS was contracted by the Association to collect debts for unpaid homeowners assessments owed to the Association by defendant Nona Tobin as the trustee for the Gordon Hansen Trust for the property located at 2763 White Sage Drive, Henderson, Nevada 89052”. This “RRFS” was a partnership subsidiary of FirstService Residential Nevada, LLC (EIN 88-0358132). The relevant debt collection contract, also concealed in discovery by Red Rock, was signed with Sun City Anthem on 4/27/12.
Judge Peterson did not require my opponents to have standing
The Plaintiff Red Rock is a different legal entity from Red Rock Financial Services, LLC, is a disinterested non-party utilized by their shared attorney to improperly file rogue documents into these proceedings. Judge Peterson’s 7/7/22 declaration that Red Rock LLC was a party is factually and legally incorrect. Red Rock LLC never had a contract with Sun City Anthem, never had the proceeds, never had anything to do with this case until Steven Scow started adding the LLC designation in the caption or filing rogue documents in when the plaintiff or the counter-defendant had not filed a responsive pleading or a written opposition or filed a motion.
Judge Peterson gave preferential treatment to my opponents
The interpleader action was a meritless abuse of process.
Judge Peterson assumed without support of evidence or law that ALL the proceeds didn’t have to be distributed after the sale
Red Rock misrepresented in the complaint that it faced multiple liabilities.
I presented evidence that this was false and Judge Peterson did not distribute the funds to me for over yet and almost all the funds are gone in fees.
How Plaintiff Red Rock is identified
The funds that the court was asked to distribute were the excess proceeds of an HOA sale conducted by FirstService Residential Nevada LLC (Formerly RMI Management LLC) dba Red Rock Financial Services, a partnership (EIN 88-0358132) that was under a 4/27/12 debt collection contract and the NRS 649 debt collection license with Sun City Anthem that was terminated in April, 2015.
Plaintiff Red Rock wrote a check to the court on its collection account
Shown below is the check for the interpleaded proceeds that Red Rock agent gave to Steven Scow on 8/28/14 with instructions to remit it to court. That check is written on a co-mingled collection account that is under the control of Scow’s client FirstService Residential dba Red Rock Financial Services, a partnership (EIN 88-0358132) who is the Plaintiff in this case.
Why Scow refusing to distribute the funds is harassment, maybe conversion
This is significant because the interpleader action was meritless because Scow was supposed to deposit the money with the court in 2014 as his client Red Rock instructed, but he failed to do so. I have spent over $300,000 trying to get my huse back and these funds and Scow has fought me every step of the way.
The cover up – why they fight so hard to silence me
He has filed false evidence in response to subpoena to cover up that Red Rock sold my house without notice, that included files and accounts that had been doctored and he acted in concert with the Nationstar and HOA attorneys to cover up that the sale was void in its entirety because Red Rock conducted the sale after it had rejected assessments that cured the default three times.
It would have been over BUT FOR
The sale should have been voided in the 1st action, and it would have been BUT FOR the misconduct of the opposing parties that met ex parte with Judge Kishner and convinced her that I had never been granted leave to intervene as an individual, and therefore that all of my verified evidence and me, a necessary party under Rule 19, were excluded from the trial.
As a result, I was never permitted to defend my 3/28/17 deed.
There never was the evidentiary hearing mandated by NRS 40.110.
Judge Kishner awarded quiet title to Jimijack on 6/24/19 who had no deed at all to protect after Jimijack had fraudulently reconveyed its defective inadmissible deed on 5/1/19 to non-party Joel A Stokes.
Nationstar didn’t have to go to trial to prove anything because the court didn’t know that the lien it released on 6/3/19 had already been rescinded on 3/8/19 as if it had never existed.
My claim of conversion and my claim for interest and penalties stems from the fact that I have been forced to litigate over and over to get money that he was supposed to deposit with the court in 2014 and not obstruct
I assert that his successful manipulation of the court got my claims unfairly precluded and got me unfairly declared a vexatious litigant. Scow tricked the court into not looking at the evidence by repeatedly saying that the evidence had been examined before when it had not been.
The banks should have been dismissed. The court allowed attorneys for disinterested parties and non-parties file oppositions to my claims for the proceeds because I had other claims
2/16/21 FirstService Residential dba Red Rock Financial Services, a partnership (EIN 88-0358132) served five defendants a complaint for interpleader when only one had standing to make a claim
2/17/21 Republic Services filed a disclaimer of interest and withdrew from the case
3/8/21 I, Nona Tobin, as an individual, filed the only timely counter-claim for the interpleaded proceeds, and contained the compulsory counter-claims that I had vs. Red Rock and cross-claims vs. Nationstar of Fraud, Conversion, Racketeering, and sanctions per NRCP 11, NRS 18.010(2), NRS 207.270(1)(4). NRS 42.005
The court didn’t require the banks to file NRCP 13(a)(1) counterclaim for the proceeds or answer my crossclaims
4/9/21 Nationstar and Wells Fargo filed a nonsensical answer that had NONE of the compulsory NRCP 13(a)(1) counter-claims, including for the proceeds and NO timely response to my 3/8/21 cross-claims, and NO mention of res judicata in its affirmative defenses. Further, the banks didn’t properly disclaim interest in the proceeds, and the first filing, or any filing thereafter, did not include an Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure so when considered with the affidavit supporting Akerman’s motion to withdraw, it is likely that Wells Fargo doesn’t know it was even in this case.
4/12/21. I filed a motion for an order to distribute the interpleaded funds to me as the sole claimant with interest in which I showed the property records that proved my claim and showed that the banks had no standing to oppose me
4/15/21 I filed a motion for summary judgment as no one filed a timely response to my 3/8/21 courter-claims and cross-claims
4/16/21 Non-party Red Rock Financial Services LLC, filed a motion to dismiss my 3/8/21 counter-claims.
4/26/21 Doc ID# 31 Wells Fargo, N.A. and Nationstar Mortgage LLC’s Limited Opposition to Defendant Nona Tobin’s Motion for an Order to Distribute Interpleaded Proceeds
4/27/21 Doc ID# 32 Scow listed Non-party Red Rock Financial Services, LLC as the Plaintiff and the counter-defendant to Wells Fargo, N.A. and Nationstar Mortgage LLC’s Limited Opposition to Defendant Nona Tobin’s Motion for an Order to Distribute Interpleaded Proceeds. In either case, it just manipulated and confused the court who never understood what was really going on.
Red Rock LLC has nothing to do with this case and Scow knows it
Instead of distributing the proceeds to me in 2021 as the sole claimant they jerked me around for years precluding all my claims
“Legal Standard “In an interpleader action, the ‘stakeholder’ of a sum of money sues all those who might have claim to the money, deposits the money with the district court, and lets the claimants litigate who is entitled to the money.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1992)
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Pundyk, No. 2:16-cv-01196-APG-GWF, at *2-3 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2017) (“District courts have original jurisdiction over interpleader actions involving $500 or more in controversy if “two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship…are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such money or property…” 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a).
Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows interpleader of disputed funds where a Plaintiff is subject to double or multiple liability. Perfekt Mktg., LLC v. Luxury Vacation Deals, LLC, 2015 WL 10012987, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 2015). The purpose of the interpleader is for the stakeholder to “protect itself against the problems posed by multiple claimants to a single fund.” Lee v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012).
An interpleader action typically involves two stages. Id. In the first stage, the district court decides whether the requirements for a rule or statutory interpleader action have been met by determining if there is a single fund at issue and whether there are adverse claimants to that fund. Id. If the Court finds that the interpleader action has been properly brought, it then makes a determination of the respective rights of the claimants. Id.”)
All proceeds were legally required to be distributed AFTER THE SALE in 2014.
rrfs 047
The interpleader complaint in 2021 was meritless.
Steven Scow filed for interpleader in 2021 when his client FirstService Residential dba Red Rock Financial Services (EIN 88-0358-132) instructed him to remit a check designated as excess proceeds to the court as the law required.
In 2021 Steven Scow did not deposit the stale 2014 check to the court nor did he admit he had defied the law and his client’s instructions for seven years.
2/3/21 Scow filed the complaint knowing Red Rock did not have standing to file for interpleader in 2021 when he had been instructed to remit the funds to court on 8/28/14.
“Legal Standard “In an interpleader action, the ‘stakeholder’ of a sum of money sues all those who might have claim to the money, deposits the money with the district court, and lets the claimants litigate who is entitled to the money.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1992)
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Pundyk, No. 2:16-cv-01196-APG-GWF, at *2-3 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2017) (“District courts have original jurisdiction over interpleader actions involving $500 or more in controversy if “two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship…are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such money or property…” 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a).
Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows interpleader of disputed funds where a Plaintiff is subject to double or multiple liability. Perfekt Mktg., LLC v. Luxury Vacation Deals, LLC, 2015 WL 10012987, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 2015). The purpose of the interpleader is for the stakeholder to “protect itself against the problems posed by multiple claimants to a single fund.” Lee v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012).
An interpleader action typically involves two stages. Id. In the first stage, the district court decides whether the requirements for a rule or statutory interpleader action have been met by determining if there is a single fund at issue and whether there are adverse claimants to that fund. Id. If the Court finds that the interpleader action has been properly brought, it then makes a determination of the respective rights of the claimants. Id.”)
High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Ass’n, Nonprofit Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, 402 P.3d 639, 645-46 (Nev. 2017) (“Under Nevada law, an action must be commenced by the real party in interest—”one who possesses the right to enforce the claim and has a significant interest in the litigation.” Szilagyi v. Testa , 99 Nev. 834, 838, 673 P.2d 495, 498 (1983) ; see NRCP 17(a). Generally, a party has standing to assert only its own rights and cannot raise the claims of a third party not before the court. Deal v. 999 Lakeshore Ass’n , 94 Nev. 301, 304, 579 P.2d 775, 777 (1978)”)
Stockmeier v. State, Dep’t of Corrections, 122 Nev. 385, 393 (Nev. 2006) (“This court has a “long history of requiring an actual justiciable controversy as a predicate to judicial relief.” In cases for declaratory relief and where constitutional matters arise, this court has required plaintiffs to meet increased jurisdictional standing requirements. However, where the Legislature has provided the people of Nevada with certain statutory rights, we have not required constitutional standing to assert such rights but instead have examined the language of the statute itself to determine whether the plaintiff had standing to sue.”)
My 3/28/17 deed made me the only one with with standing to assert a claim for the proceeds as all other liens were released by mid-2019 before the 1st action was decided.
3/30/17 Republic Services released both its garbage liens due to the 3-year statute of limitations on non-enforcement.
2/17/21 Republic Services filed a disclaimer of interest and withdrew from the lawsuit the day after it was served
6/3/19 Nationstar released the lien of the Western Thrift & Loan 1st deed of trust
Two days before the quiet title trial in the first action, Nationstar recorded a release of the lien of the first deed of trust, delivering the property free and clear to Joel A. Stokes, a non-party individual. In return for recording this unauthorized lien release, Nationstar received $355,000. As a result, Joel A. Stokes and Sandra F. Stokes, trustees of the Jimijack Irrevocable Trust, gained quiet title in the first action’s trial, despite the fact that Jimijack’s deed, inadmissible as evidence and leqally insufficient to hold or transfer title, had been covertly quitclaimed to the non-party before the trial. The trial did not consider evidence as mandated by NRS 40.110.
3/12/15 Wells Fargo released the lien of the Wells Fargo 2nd deed of trust
Link to 3/12/15 PDF of Wells Fargo’s 2nd deed of trust lien release
Wells Fargo was not involved in the first two actions. The bank filed an IRS Form 1099-C to cancel the outstanding $15,000 debt on the line of credit after the borrower, Gordon Bruce Hansen, passed away on January 14, 2012. However, they didn’t release the lien until a few months after the HOA sale. Wells Fargo never asserted to be the beneficiary of Hansen’s July 22, 2004, first deed of trust, and was likely unaware of Bank of America’s recorded corporate assignment of its non-existent interest.
Additionally, Wells Fargo probably didn’t know that debt buyer Nationstar intermittently claimed to service the loan on their behalf, or that Akerman LLP alleged that they were authorized to represent Wells Fargo in the A-21-828840-C interpleader action.
For the last four years, I have subscribed to a legal services research service found on casetext.com. On 3/15/23, I upgraded to its new level of service called Co-counsel that includes an OpenAI-enabled document analysis feature that I utilized to assess Judge Peterson’s appearance of impartiality in the court hearings. I asked for an analysis of each hearing by providing a series of questions. Below are the responses for the 2/2/23 hearing.
Identify where in the transcript the judge made accommodating statements to or about the parties present
Pgs. 21-22, 3, 5, 10, 11
The judge makes several accommodating statements throughout the transcript. The most explicit examples are on pages 21-22 (LINES: 138-140) where the judge thanks Mr. Scow and asks Ms. Turley if she has anything to add. There are also other instances where the judge is understanding or polite to the parties present, such as not faulting Mr. Scow for a delay (pgs. 3,5) and allowing him to speak when he interrupts (pgs. 10,11).
The judge does not make any explicitly accommodating statements, but there are a few places where the judge seems to be understanding or accommodating. For example, the judge does not fault Mr. Scow for the delay in submitting an order because they were waiting for a transcript and for a writ issue to be resolved (LINE:130). Additionally, the judge tells counsel that they do not need to file an opposition to certain motions because the judge is advancing all motions to that day (LINE:113).
The judge does not make any explicitly accommodating statements, but there are a few instances where the judge is polite or respectful to the parties present. For example, the judge says “Go ahead” when Mr. Scow interrupts (LINE:116), and the judge responds “Okay, perfect” when Mr. Scow confirms that Ms. Tobin received notice (LINE:125).
The judge made several accommodating statements to or about the parties present. For example, the judge said “Thanks for coming down” (LINE:139) and “Appreciate it” (LINE:140) to Mr. Scow. Additionally, the judge asked Ms. Turley if she had anything to add, and when she said no, the judge responded “All right” (LINE:138).
Identify where in the transcript the judge made complimentary statements to or about Nona Tobin.
No relevant language found.
Identify where in the transcripts the judge made negative statements to or about Nona Tobin.
Identify where in the transcripts the judge made negative statements to or about Nona Tobin.
Identify where in the transcripts the judge made negative statements to or about Nona Tobin.
Throughout
The judge makes negative statements about Nona Tobin throughout the transcript, including that she does not understand the law (Lines 103, 115), is repetitive and unmeritorious in her filings (Lines 110, 124, 126), and is a “vexatious litigant” (Line 113). These statements occur on pages 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 16, and 17.
The judge makes several negative statements or implications about Nona Tobin throughout the transcript. For example, the judge says that Tobin “does not understand the nature of an interpleader complaint” (LINE:115), that she “continues to argue” a point that has already been decided (LINE:120), and that she “continues to file seriatim motions that were without legal or factual merit” (LINE:126).
The judge makes several negative statements about Nona Tobin throughout the transcript. For example, the judge says that Tobin is “wrong and… misunderstanding what the law is” (Line 103), that she “did not seek leave of this Court to do so as required” (Line 108), that she “is simply wrong” (Line 110), and that she has filed “seriatim motions with this Court that are devoid of legal merit” (Line 124).
The judge makes several negative statements about Nona Tobin throughout the transcript. For example, the judge refers to her filings as “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious” (LINE:111), and declares her a “vexatious litigant” (LINE:113).
Identify where in the transcripts the judge made negative statements to or about the parties present.
Against Ms. Tobin
The judge makes a number of negative statements or implications about Ms. Tobin throughout the transcript, including that she does not understand the law (Lines 103, 115, 118), files motions without merit (Lines 108, 110, 116, 126), and is a “vexatious litigant” (Line 113). The judge also refers to one of her requests as “inappropriate” (Line 145). These statements occur on pages 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, and 17.
The judge makes a number of negative statements or implications about Ms. Tobin throughout the transcript. For example, the judge says that “Ms. Tobin does not understand the nature of an interpleader complaint” (
The judge makes several negative statements about Ms. Tobin throughout the transcript. For example, the judge says that Ms. Tobin is “wrong and… misunderstanding what the law is” (Line 103), that she “did not seek leave of this Court to do so as required” (Line 108), that she “is simply wrong” (Line 110), and that she “continues to file seriatim motions with this Court that are devoid of legal merit” (Line 116). Additionally, the judge refers to Ms. Tobin’s request for judicial notice as “inappropriate” and “legally devoid of merit” (Line 145).
The judge makes a few negative statements or references to Ms. Tobin throughout the transcript. For example, the judge refers to her motions as “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious”
The judge references denying Tobin’s motions or precluding her claims in multiple places throughout the transcripts. On pages 3-4, the judge discusses dismissing Tobin’s claims, denying her motion to reconsider, and implying that all motions will be denied. On pages 8, 10, 11, and 13, the judge mentions that Tobin’s motions have been denied multiple times and that she may be declared a vexatious litigant. Finally, on pages 15-17, the judge discusses enjoining Tobin from filing complaints, denying her motion to reconsider, and declaring her a vexatious litigant.
The judge references dismissing Tobin’s claims on the basis of claim preclusion on line 121. Additionally, the judge discusses denying Tobin’s motion to reconsider on line 122. Finally, the judge states that she is advancing all motions to the current day and implies that they will all be denied on line 114.
The judge does not explicitly state that Tobin’s claims are precluded or that she has no claims, but the judge does mention multiple times that Tobin’s motions have been denied. Specifically, the judge says “once again denied Tobin’s claims” (Line 105), “the Court will have no other choice but to issue an order to show cause why Ms. Tobin should not be declared a vexatious litigant” (Line 116), “the Court was going to declare her a vexatious litigant” (Line 124), and “she filed another motion to reconsider on the same issues that have been denied over and over and over again” (Line 139).
The judge references denying Tobin’s motions or precluding her claims in several places. For example, the judge says “The Court is going to enjoin her from filing any complaints” (Line 101), “If Ms. Tobin’s complaint is meritless or if it fails to allege a cognizable, legal claim Ms. Tobin’s complaint shall be sent back to her unfiled” (Line 102), “Ms. Tobin is enjoined from filing anything other than a timely notice of appeal into this case” (Line 103), and “the Court declares Ms. Tobin a vexatious litigant and denies the motion to reconsider that is being advanced to today” (Line 115).
The judge explicitly states that Red Rock Financial Services is a party to the case on two separate occasions (pgs. 3, 9), and also makes reference to them in the context of the case on another occasion (pg. 19).
The judge states that “It is very clear that Ms. Tobin does not understand the nature of an interpleader complaint. Red Rock Financial Services is a party to this case.” Additionally, the judge later says “They have interplead funds. That is the only thing that is at issue in this case.”
The judge states that “Red Rock Financial Services is a party in this case. They are the interpleader in this case. She filed cross-claims against them.”
While the judge does not explicitly state that Red Rock LLC is a party as a matter of law, the judge does mention Red Rock Financial Services several times, including instructing that they “shall turn over to Ms. Tobin the amount of blank” (Line 131) and that they are to be included in the order being prepared (Line 129).
Lines 113, pg. 18
The judge explicitly stated that the parties did not need to file an opposition to Tobin’s motions in line 113 (pg. 3), and also implied it in response to Mr. Scow’s question on page 18.
The judge stated that “I do not feel that it is necessary for them to file an opposition to the motion to reconsider that is set to be heard on the 8th or on the 28th. Nor do I find it necessary for them to file an opposition to the motions that are set for in chambers, for February the 8th” in
The judge does not explicitly state that the parties do not have to file a written opposition, but the implication is clear when the judge says “I advanced that to today, too” in response to Mr. Scow’s question about the hearing on the 8th being in chambers only.
The judge stated that the court had tried to call Tobin but she didn’t answer her phone on line 107 (pg. 2)
The judge states that “We just attempted to phone her and she did not answer the phone” on line 107.
The court was consistently displeased with Tobin’s allegations and motions, dismissing them as meritless and expressing frustration with her repeated filings (pgs. 3,4,7,8,9,10,11,13,14). The court ultimately declared her a vexatious litigant and enjoined her from filing any further complaints without review (pgs. 15,16,17).
The court seems to have largely dismissed Tobin’s allegations. The judge notes that Tobin “does not understand the nature of an interpleader complaint,” and that “Red Rock Financial Services is a party to this case.” Additionally, the judge criticizes Tobin for filing “seriatim motions that were devoid of legal or factual merit,” and argues that her attempt to withdraw those filings does not “cure” the issue.
The court repeatedly denies Tobin’s claims and motions, and expresses frustration with her repeated filings. The court ultimately considers declaring her a “vexatious litigant” in order to restrict her ability to file further motions.
The court was not pleased with Tobin’s allegations. The court enjoined her from filing any complaints until they are reviewed by the Chief Judge, and if they are found to be meritless, they will be returned to her unfiled. The court also declared her a vexatious litigant, citing her “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious motions.”
Procedural errors; meritless motions
The court provides a number of reasons for denying Tobin’s motions, including that she did not follow proper procedure (pgs. 9,11), did not justify her request for relief (pgs. 9,11), and misunderstood the nature of the complaint (pgs. 3,4,6,7). Additionally, the court argues that Tobin has repeatedly filed motions that lack merit and has been warned about being declared a vexatious litigant (pgs. 9,11,16,17).
The court argues that Tobin’s motions should be denied for a few reasons. First, the court contends that Tobin does not understand the nature of an interpleader complaint and that Red Rock Financial Services is indeed a party to the case. Second, the court argues that Tobin has continued to file “seriatim motions” that lack legal or factual merit, even after being warned not to do so. Finally, the court argues that Tobin’s request for judicial notice is not appropriate because the facts she wants the court to take notice of are subject to reasonable dispute.
The court provides several reasons for denying Tobin’s motions. First, Tobin did not seek leave of the court to file a motion for reconsideration, as required by EDCR 2.24(a). Second, she did not identify which of the six grounds for relief from a final order would justify relief or reconsideration. Third, the court argues that Tobin is incorrect in asserting that Red Rock Financial Services is not a party to the case. Finally, the court notes that Tobin has repeatedly filed motions that are devoid of legal merit, and has been warned that she risks being declared a vexatious litigant if she continues to do so.
The court cites several reasons for denying Tobin’s motions. The court argues that Tobin’s motions are “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious,” and that she has been given ample opportunity to respond and argue her case. Additionally, the court notes that they had previously warned Tobin that if she continued to file motions that were “legally and factually devoid of merit,” they would declare her a “vexatious litigant.”
Claim preclusion; harassment
The court dismissed Tobin’s claims on the basis of claim preclusion (pg. 4), and denied her motion to reconsider. Additionally, the court has repeatedly expressed frustration with Tobin’s “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious motions” (pgs. 13-14, 16-17), which may have contributed to the decision to dismiss her claims with prejudice.
The court dismissed Tobin’s claims on the basis of claim preclusion, as stated in line 121. Additionally, the court denied Tobin’s motion to reconsider this decision (line 122).
While the document does not directly address this question, it does mention that the court has repeatedly denied Tobin’s claims and motions, and that the court finds her filings to be “legally devoid of merit” and “doing nothing except for attempting to harass the attorneys that have been involved in this matter.”
While the document does not explicitly address the reasoning behind the dismissal of these claims, it does mention that Ms. Tobin has filed “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious motions” and that she was warned about being declared a “vexatious litigant” if she continued to file motions “legally and factually devoid of merit.”
There are multiple negative references to Tobin throughout the document. The Court criticizes her for not understanding the nature of a complaint (pgs. 3-7), for filing motions without merit (pgs. 8,9,11,13,14), and for not attending a hearing (pgs. 8,9,11,13,14). The Court also refers to her as a “vexatious litigant” on multiple occasions (pgs. 16,17,21).
There are multiple negative references to Tobin in this document. For example, the Court states that Tobin “continues to argue that Red Rock Financial Services is not a party to this case” and that “it is very clear that Ms. Tobin does not understand the nature of an interpleader complaint.” Additionally, the Court references Tobin’s “seriatim motions that were without legal or factual merit” and warns her that she may be declared a “vexatious litigant.”
There are multiple negative references to Tobin in this document. The Court repeatedly refers to her filings as “devoid of legal merit,” “repetitive,” and “abusive.” The Court also notes that she did not attend a hearing and did not provide any notice that she would not be present. Finally, the Court discusses the possibility of declaring her a “vexatious litigant.”
There are multiple negative references to Tobin in this document. The Court refers to her filings as “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious” (LINE:111) and declares her a “vexatious litigant” (LINE:113). Additionally, Mr. Scow notes that Tobin’s behavior has been “vexatious” for the Court as well (LINE:136).
While there is no explicit positive reference to Tobin’s opponents, there are a few places in the document that could be seen as favorable to them. The Court notes Mr. Scow’s caution and thoroughness (pgs. 5,7), criticizes Tobin for filing motions without merit (pgs. 8,9,11,14), and expresses appreciation for Mr. Scow’s cooperation (pgs. 17,19,20,22).
While there is no explicit positive reference to Tobin’s opponents, the document does contain some information that could be seen as favorable to them. For example, the Court notes that Mr. Scow submitted an amended order “in an abundance of caution” to reflect Tobin’s proposed changes, which suggests that he is being careful and thorough. Additionally, the Court repeatedly criticizes Tobin for filing motions that are “devoid of legal or factual merit,” which implies that her opponents may have stronger arguments.
While there is no direct positive reference to Tobin’s opponents, the document does contain several negative references to Tobin herself, which could be seen as indirectly positive for her opponents. For example, the document states that Tobin’s proposed changes are “legally incorrect,” that she is “wrong” and “misunderstanding what the law is,” and that she has filed motions that are “devoid of legal merit.”
While there is no direct positive reference to Tobin’s opponents, the Court does express appreciation to Mr. Scow for his suggestions and cooperation, saying “thank you” multiple times and noting that he is “happy to do” what the Court requests.
– The document is a transcript of a court proceeding involving Red Rock Financial Services and Nona Tobin.
– The proceeding took place on Thursday, February 2nd, 2023, before Judge Jessica K. Peterson.
– Steven B. Scow represented Red Rock Financial Services, while Vanessa M. Turley represented Nationstar.
– Nona Tobin did not appear in court, and did not answer when called.
– Several motions were on the docket, including requests for judicial notice of attorney misconduct.
– The judge advanced all motions to withdraw, and a motion to reconsider to the day of the proceeding despite Tobin’s absence.
– The judge clarified that Red Rock Financial Services is a party to the case, despite Tobin’s arguments to the contrary.
– The judge referenced a previous hearing in which she warned Tobin against filing frivolous motions, and noted that Tobin had continued to do so.
– The judge ruled that she could not take judicial notice of attorney misconduct as requested by Tobin, as the facts were subject to dispute.
– The judge also referenced an order from a previous hearing that was not entered until January 2023 due to Tobin’s appeals to the Supreme Court.
Pages 8-14
– The Court denies all of Ms. Tobin’s proposed changes to an order, as they are legally incorrect or contain argument.
– Ms. Tobin files a motion to reconsider an order from January 16, 2023, as well as a renewed motion to strike Red Rock Financial Services’ filings.
– The Court explains that Ms. Tobin is misunderstanding the law, and denies her motion for reconsideration.
– The Court references rule 2.24 of the Eighth Judicial District Court rules and rule 60(b) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern motions to set aside a judgement or order.
– Ms. Tobin did not seek leave to file a motion for reconsideration, nor did she identify grounds for relief.
– The Court finds that Red Rock Financial Services is a party to the case, and that Ms. Tobin’s argument is incorrect.
– The Court references a previous order that warned Ms. Tobin against filing frivolous motions, and notes that she received notice of the order.
– The Court discusses the requirements for declaring someone a vexatious litigant, and finds that Ms. Tobin meets the criteria.
– The Court imposes a restrictive order on Ms. Tobin, barring her from filing new actions unless the Court reviews the filing and determines that it is not frivolous.
Pages 15-22
– Ms. Tobin is warned against filing complaints against individual attorneys involved in the case.
– The Court orders Ms. Tobin to submit any complaints to the Chief Judge of the District Court for review before filing.
– Ms. Tobin is only allowed to file three specific items: a notice of appeal, an objection to the Brunzell affidavit, or an objection to the amount received from the interplead funds.
– The Court declares Ms. Tobin a vexatious litigant and denies her motion to reconsider.
– The Court requests that Mr. Scow prepare an order detailing the Court’s decision.
– The Court discusses the possibility of disposing of the entire case with this final order.
– The Court requests that Mr. Scow leave blank spaces in the order for the amount of fees and the amount Ms. Tobin is entitled to from the interplead funds.
Identify how the court reacted to Tobin’s allegations.
The court was consistently displeased with Tobin’s allegations and motions, dismissing them as meritless and expressing frustration with her repeated filings (pgs. 3,4,7,8,9,10,11,13,14). The court ultimately declared her a vexatious litigant and enjoined her from filing any further complaints without review (pgs. 15,16,17).
The court seems to have largely dismissed Tobin’s allegations. The judge notes that Tobin “does not understand the nature of an interpleader complaint,” and that “Red Rock Financial Services is a party to this case.” Additionally, the judge criticizes Tobin for filing “seriatim motions that were devoid of legal or factual merit,” and argues that her attempt to withdraw those filings does not “cure” the issue.
The court repeatedly denies Tobin’s claims and motions, and expresses frustration with her repeated filings. The court ultimately considers declaring her a “vexatious litigant” in order to restrict her ability to file further motions.
The court was not pleased with Tobin’s allegations. The court enjoined her from filing any complaints until they are reviewed by the Chief Judge, and if they are found to be meritless, they will be returned to her unfiled. The court also declared her a vexatious litigant, citing her “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious motions.”
Describe the court’s reasoning on why Tobin’s motions should be denied.
Procedural errors; meritless motions
The court provides a number of reasons for denying Tobin’s motions, including that she did not follow proper procedure (pgs. 9,11), did not justify her request for relief (pgs. 9,11), and misunderstood the nature of the complaint (pgs. 3,4,6,7). Additionally, the court argues that Tobin has repeatedly filed motions that lack merit and has been warned about being declared a vexatious litigant (pgs. 9,11,16,17).
The court argues that Tobin’s motions should be denied for a few reasons. First, the court contends that Tobin does not understand the nature of an interpleader complaint and that Red Rock Financial Services is indeed a party to the case. Second, the court argues that Tobin has continued to file “seriatim motions” that lack legal or factual merit, even after being warned not to do so. Finally, the court argues that Tobin’s request for judicial notice is not appropriate because the facts she wants the court to take notice of are subject to reasonable dispute.
The court provides several reasons for denying Tobin’s motions. First, Tobin did not seek leave of the court to file a motion for reconsideration, as required by EDCR 2.24(a). Second, she did not identify which of the six grounds for relief from a final order would justify relief or reconsideration. Third, the court argues that Tobin is incorrect in asserting that Red Rock Financial Services is not a party to the case. Finally, the court notes that Tobin has repeatedly filed motions that are devoid of legal merit, and has been warned that she risks being declared a vexatious litigant if she continues to do so.
The court cites several reasons for denying Tobin’s motions. The court argues that Tobin’s motions are “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious,” and that she has been given ample opportunity to respond and argue her case. Additionally, the court notes that they had previously warned Tobin that if she continued to file motions that were “legally and factually devoid of merit,” they would declare her a “vexatious litigant.”
Describe the court’s reasoning on why all Tobin’s claims of Fraud, Racketeering, Conversion, and petitions for sanctions were dismissed with prejudice.
Claim preclusion; harassment
The court dismissed Tobin’s claims on the basis of claim preclusion (pg. 4), and denied her motion to reconsider. Additionally, the court has repeatedly expressed frustration with Tobin’s “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious motions” (pgs. 13-14, 16-17), which may have contributed to the decision to dismiss her claims with prejudice.
The court dismissed Tobin’s claims on the basis of claim preclusion, as stated in line 121. Additionally, the court denied Tobin’s motion to reconsider this decision (line 122).
While the document does not directly address this question, it does mention that the court has repeatedly denied Tobin’s claims and motions, and that the court finds her filings to be “legally devoid of merit” and “doing nothing except for attempting to harass the attorneys that have been involved in this matter.”
While the document does not explicitly address the reasoning behind the dismissal of these claims, it does mention that Ms. Tobin has filed “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious motions” and that she was warned about being declared a “vexatious litigant” if she continued to file motions “legally and factually devoid of merit.”
Identify where in the transcripts the judge stated why she would not conduct the evidentiary hearing Tobin requested.
Multiple reasons
The judge does not explicitly state why she will not conduct the evidentiary hearing Tobin requested, but there are a few potential explanations in the transcript. The judge mentions Tobin’s history of filing frivolous motions (pg. 16), her apparent misunderstanding of the case (pg. 3), and her inappropriate and meritless request for the court to take judicial notice of alleged attorney misconduct (pg. 14).
While the judge does not explicitly state why she will not conduct the evidentiary hearing Tobin requested, she does mention that Tobin “continues to argue that Red Rock Financial Services is not a party to this case” and that “it is very clear that Ms. Tobin does not understand the nature of an interpleader complaint.” This suggests that the judge does not believe the evidentiary hearing is necessary or warranted given Tobin’s apparent misunderstanding of the case.
While the judge does not explicitly state why she will not conduct the evidentiary hearing Tobin requested, she does mention that Tobin’s request for the court to take judicial notice of alleged attorney misconduct was “inappropriate” and “legally devoid of merit.”
The judge does not explicitly state why she will not conduct the evidentiary hearing Tobin requested, but she does mention that Tobin’s “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious motions” provide “a sufficient record to support a vexatious litigant filing.” This suggests that the judge is not inclined to grant Tobin’s requests because she has a history of filing frivolous motions.
Identify any negative reference to Tobin
There are multiple negative references to Tobin throughout the document. The Court criticizes her for not understanding the nature of a complaint (pgs. 3-7), for filing motions without merit (pgs. 8,9,11,13,14), and for not attending a hearing (pgs. 8,9,11,13,14). The Court also refers to her as a “vexatious litigant” on multiple occasions (pgs. 16,17,21).
There are multiple negative references to Tobin in this document. For example, the Court states that Tobin “continues to argue that Red Rock Financial Services is not a party to this case” and that “it is very clear that Ms. Tobin does not understand the nature of an interpleader complaint.” Additionally, the Court references Tobin’s “seriatim motions that were without legal or factual merit” and warns her that she may be declared a “vexatious litigant.”
There are multiple negative references to Tobin in this document. The Court repeatedly refers to her filings as “devoid of legal merit,” “repetitive,” and “abusive.” The Court also notes that she did not attend a hearing and did not provide any notice that she would not be present. Finally, the Court discusses the possibility of declaring her a “vexatious litigant.”
There are multiple negative references to Tobin in this document. The Court refers to her filings as “repetitious, rogue, harassing, and unmeritorious” (LINE:111) and declares her a “vexatious litigant” (LINE:113). Additionally, Mr. Scow notes that Tobin’s behavior has been “vexatious” for the Court as well (LINE:136).
Identify any positive reference to Tobin’s opponents
While there is no explicit positive reference to Tobin’s opponents, there are a few places in the document that could be seen as favorable to them. The Court notes Mr. Scow’s caution and thoroughness (pgs. 5,7), criticizes Tobin for filing motions without merit (pgs. 8,9,11,14), and expresses appreciation for Mr. Scow’s cooperation (pgs. 17,19,20,22).
While there is no explicit positive reference to Tobin’s opponents, the document does contain some information that could be seen as favorable to them. For example, the Court notes that Mr. Scow submitted an amended order “in an abundance of caution” to reflect Tobin’s proposed changes, which suggests that he is being careful and thorough. Additionally, the Court repeatedly criticizes Tobin for filing motions that are “devoid of legal or factual merit,” which implies that her opponents may have stronger arguments.
While there is no direct positive reference to Tobin’s opponents, the document does contain several negative references to Tobin herself, which could be seen as indirectly positive for her opponents. For example, the document states that Tobin’s proposed changes are “legally incorrect,” that she is “wrong” and “misunderstanding what the law is,” and that she has filed motions that are “devoid of legal merit.”
While there is no direct positive reference to Tobin’s opponents, the Court does express appreciation to Mr. Scow for his suggestions and cooperation, saying “thank you” multiple times and noting that he is “happy to do” what the Court requests.
– The document is a transcript of a court proceeding involving Red Rock Financial Services and Nona Tobin.
– The proceeding took place on Thursday, February 2nd, 2023, before Judge Jessica K. Peterson.
– Steven B. Scow represented Red Rock Financial Services, while Vanessa M. Turley represented Nona Tobin.
– Nona Tobin did not appear in court, and did not answer when called.
– Several motions were on the docket, including requests for judicial notice of attorney misconduct, motions to withdraw, and a motion to reconsider.
– The judge advanced all motions to the day of the proceeding.
– The judge clarified that Red Rock Financial Services is a party to the case, despite Tobin’s arguments to the contrary.
– The judge referenced a previous hearing in which she warned Tobin against filing frivolous motions, and noted that Tobin had continued to do so.
– The judge ruled that she could not take judicial notice of attorney misconduct as requested by Tobin, as the facts were subject to dispute.
– The judge also referenced an order from a previous hearing that was not entered until January 2023 due to Tobin’s appeals to the Supreme Court.
Pages 8-14
– The Court denies all of Ms. Tobin’s proposed changes to an order, as they are legally incorrect or contain argument.
– Ms. Tobin files a motion to reconsider an order from January 16, 2023, as well as a renewed motion to strike Red Rock Financial Services’ filings.
– The Court explains that Ms. Tobin is misunderstanding the law, and denies her motion for reconsideration.
– The Court references rule 2.24 of the Eighth Judicial District Court rules and rule 60(b) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern motions to set aside a judgement or order.
– Ms. Tobin did not seek leave to file a motion for reconsideration, nor did she identify grounds for relief.
– The Court finds that Red Rock Financial Services is a party to the case, and that Ms. Tobin’s argument is incorrect.
– The Court references a previous order that warned Ms. Tobin against filing frivolous motions, and notes that she received notice of the order.
– The Court discusses the requirements for declaring someone a vexatious litigant, and finds that Ms. Tobin meets the criteria.
– The Court imposes a restrictive order on Ms. Tobin, barring her from filing new actions unless the Court reviews the filing and determines that it is not frivolous.
Pages 15-22
– Ms. Tobin is warned against filing complaints against individual attorneys involved in the case.
– The Court orders Ms. Tobin to submit any complaints to the Chief Judge of the District Court for review before filing.
– Ms. Tobin is only allowed to file three specific items: a notice of appeal, an objection to the Brunzell affidavit, or an objection to the amount received from the interplead funds.
– The Court declares Ms. Tobin a vexatious litigant and denies her motion to reconsider.
– The Court requests that Mr. Scow prepare an order detailing the Court’s decision.
– The Court discusses the possibility of disposing of the entire case with this final order.
– The Court requests that Mr. Scow leave blank spaces in the order for the amount of fees and the amount Ms. Tobin is entitled to from the interplead funds.
